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ABSTRACT 
Loathed and Falling Limbs: A Sociological Exploration of Embodiment Troubles 
Claire Ashton 
This thesis explores unique problems of embodiment with particular emphasis on 
the desire for radical transformations of the self by disembodiment. Based on 10 
interviews with informants, major focus is paid to 4 who identify as having Body 
Integrity Identity Disorder (BUD: the compelling sense that one is "trapped" in 
their fully able embodiment as is meant to be disabled) and an interview with a 
leading plastic surgeon, the coordinator of psychology at a correctional institute 
and a professional body modifier. This permits a triangulation of different 
practical and ideological perspectives, often mutually conflicting. These matters 
can be theororized through the work of Kristeva, Baudrillard and Butler. The body 
is a metaphor for society and these theorists of abjection and the relations 
between self and society offer some insights into these embodiment troubles 
(e.g. the desire for amputation or paralysis). 
The number of people suffering from somatoform disorders like Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder, BUD and Gender Identity Disorder seems to be increasing, 
along with the dramatic number of people accessing cosmetic surgery. These 
phenomena may reflect the embodiment deficit, to use Niemeyer's (2007) term: 
reflecting the desire for extreme physical engagements, to belong to or create a 
new identity, to experience a new reality, or as the transference of psycho-sexual 
trauma onto the limb(s) in question. The diagnosis of BUD is highly controversial: 
a neurological problem, perhaps, or psychological due to developmental issues, 
or social, facilitated by the internet. This thesis attempts to clarify this identity as 
meaningful to observers as it is to respondents. 
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Introduction: Embodiment Troubles 
Just as with so many projects we set out to write, this thesis's subject has 
trumped me and become something else. This transformation works as an ironic 
metaphorical relation with the participants in my research who have experienced 
the subject/object relation working against them in similarly tricky, albeit much 
more severe ways. 
In past research I had been working through embodiment theory and 
exploring how authors (Ozawa 2002, Langman 2003, Wolfe 2007) were using the 
body as a metaphor for society, and as a site on which society has embedded its 
various cultural landmarks, intersecting with biology, and resulting in seemingly 
new bodies. This merged with my interest in epidemiology, specifically how 
digital technology seems to be aiding in the spreading of psycho-sexual and 
somatoform maladies. I was not writing about real medical issues, but theories of 
society and technology and how the body both represents and is represented by 
these structures in analogous ways 
Through this research I encountered an article by Cart Elliott (2000) 
dealing with apotemnophilia, which refers to otherwise healthy people who 
obsessively desire to have a limb amputated. I began researching this topic and 
found that the material available on it is alive with burgeoning debates, ethical 
concerns and inconsistencies that meet such shockingly extreme phenomena. 
My original idea for preparing this project was to consolidate these views into a 
single thesis: to explore the possibilities for analysis of the fascinating 
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phenomenon of apparently healthy people electing to become amputees. The 
internet is the digital home to thousands of people claiming to suffer from this 
ailment, so I have combined a survey of previous research with my own 
interviews. 
Here is where my object of research first began to show its enigmatic 
nature. What I was calling apotemnophilia, which was a term introduced by John 
Money (1977) that literally translates as 'amputee love', turned out to have 
several names; the variations encompassing contesting meanings and points of 
view. There is one camp of research headed by psychiatrist Michael First (the 
editor of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Vol-IV and 
pending V), who coined the term Gender Identity Disorder (GID) to describe 
transsexuals desiring sexual reassignment surgery. First considers the desire for 
voluntary amputation to be a matter of Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BUD). 
This term is considered useful in that it rescues the problem from the sexual 
paraphilia (unusual and problematic sexual desire) aspect which apotemnophilia 
automatically connotes (philia meaning love in the sexual sense), to encompass 
a more broad understanding of an overall identity problem. BUD is not a sexual 
disorder, it is an identity disorder. Participants are overall familiar and 
comfortable with the use of this term to describe their problem. The keen 
acceptance of the term BUD probably stems from a reservation towards 
indicating their desires sexual, as they are all extremely well-versed in the 
literature and debates and know that classification of a paraphilia prevents 
momentum for the potential for rights to access surgery. If enough people 
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demonstrate the symptoms of BUD, and if the proposition for inclusion of BUD is 
accepted by its editorial committee, it will receive a distinct entry in the DSM, in 
gaining this legitimacy, treatment options will open for exploration by stakes-
holding researchers. 
Carl Elliott (2000, 2003) contests the categorical distinction between 
apotemnophilia and BUD, arguing that sexuality and identity are intrinsically 
inseparable. He implicates the increasing diagnostic categorization of new 
disorders in their creation, spread and psycho pharmaceutical treatment (see 
chapter 6). Upon initial research online I came across approximately one 
hundred websites host to a specific vocabulary for people obsessed with 
disability (usually amputation): the website run by one of my informants, "Sean" is 
unique in that it opts for the term transabled, as a sort of politically correct 
alternative to the following; online there are thousands of wannabes, these are 
considered the people with apotemnophilia or BUD who are aroused by the idea 
of being disabled. Devotees are fascinated with their sex partners being 
amputees (or another disability), and pretenders, who are likely wannabes, 
literally pretend to be disabled. Wannabes may also be devotees, and possibility 
pretenders. For all groups, sexual arousal is considered contingent on the 
fantasy of disability. 
The splintering of radical embodiment troubles of this order into several 
specific categorical directions was a confusing and revealing aspect in beginning 
to research this paper. I began re-thinking the groups I had defined and decided 
to focus the project on radical transformations of embodiment as demonstrated 
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through voluntary amputations, among other forms of problematic discords 
between our body as we conceptualize its ideal form and the form of our physical 
embodiment as it presently is. I re-named the project (Loathed and Falling Limbs: 
A Sociology of Elective Self-Amputation) the more inclusive title; Loathed and 
Falling Limbs: Extreme Embodiment Troubles. 
There are a variety of disorders that can be included under the umbrella 
term "Embodiment Troubles" including those problems recognized by First and 
other therapists as related to, but distinct from BUD, including Body Dysmorphic 
Disorder (BDD). BDD sufferers are characterized by their exaggerated 
perception of a physical flaw which may appear in a very mild form, but is inflated 
by the person experiencing it to the point at which it controls every facet of their 
life. Often BDD patients are unable to keep jobs, relationships or even leave the 
house. They are severely self-conscious and spend their time consistently 
obsessing over the problematic feature of their embodiment. In some cases the 
obsession may prove fatal; an example of BDD as told by my informant Dr. 
Schwarz: 
"I'll give you an example of a type of dysmorphic syndrome which is not 
only serious; it requires treatment, but is also dangerous for the doctor, I 
don't know whether you're aware of the acronym SIMON; single, 
immature, male, obsessive, narcissistic. These are typically young males 
that are obsessed with their nose, it's a dysmorphic syndrome, and they're 
so obsessed that they're operated and they're unhappy regardless of what 
has been done and they often turn violent towards the physician, there 
have been 3 or 4 cases in North America of plastic surgeons that were 
attacked, a couple of deaths. One in Montreal, an older plastic surgeon at 
the Royal Vic, who was attacked with a steel pipe as he was coming out of 
his office by one of these patients. They're loaded with hostility behind all 
of the other things I have mentioned to you. So they're ill people and if you 
don't recognize it... I operated on one of them and regretted it forever. 
4 
He's fine, often they're quite bright, but they'll never be happy. They'll 
never be happy. He had a perfect result after the rhinoplasty, but he went 
and got someone else in the States to put a bone graft in his nose after 
that!" 
While Dr. Schwarz, among others, may consider Body Integrity Identity 
Disorder a form of Body Dysmorphic Disorder, others (namely First) value its 
purported uniqueness. Just as BDD researches have successfully asserted its 
distinction from OCD (Phillips, 1996), BUD removes itself into further 
categorization as distinctive from BDD under the somewhat hazy diagnostic 
criteria as laid out by a team of researchers at the 3rd annual BUD conference 
(First, 2003), which surmises that BUD sufferers perceive their embodiment as 
normal but foreign, with an onset occurring in childhood, but is always 
established after puberty. BDD is importantly distinct because it does not occur 
until adolescence. 
This timeline does ally with my research participants who identify the 
period between adolescence and early adulthood as the time in which their 
desire came out in full force, though it seems logical that the establishment of 
BUD immediately following or during puberty would necessarily comprehend an 
element of sexuality that can only be realized as physical desire and sexual 
identity are becoming increasingly fortified by the embodiment's changing form. 
BUD advocates insist that there is no sexual element for some sufferers. Some of 
my interview participants are adamant about this distinction, while others express 
some confusion. For example, while Sean reveals that he does have a "slight 
bondage fetish", he feels that this does not necessarily relate to his desire for 
immobility (to be a paraplegic) and while he asserts that (in relation to his 
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sexuality, sex drive, etc..) that he is "fine there", "allnorma?, he would not mind 
genital dysfunction (impotence) as a consequence of his paraplegia. Perhaps this 
division is an essential component of the rhetoric surrounding the categorization 
of a new illness experience for both the physician and the patient, forbidding its 
inclusion in the paradigm of another paraphilia, and increasing its eligibility for 
legitimacy and treatment through surgery. 
BDD is an example of a Psychosomatic or Somatoform disorder qualified 
by the experience of physical symptoms for a condition which is not (yet 
locatable as) physically present (other examples include hysterical blindness and 
chronic fatigue). A recent study by Ramachandran and McGeoch (2007) 
searches for links between BUD and somatoparaphrenia: 
"A condition which can occur after a stroke in the right parietal region, 
(where) the patient denies ownership of a limb on the left side of his body-
typically the arm... We propose that BUD is caused by an uncoupling of 
the genetically based scaffolding of one's body image, in the right parietal 
region, from the actual physical body parts that this area normally 
represents. The fact that most BUD patients date their symptoms back to 
early childhood would be in keeping with a genetic basis for this 
uncoupling." 
Their research involves stimulating the right parietal region of the brain by 
shooting water or air into the ear. One of my participants, Claire, also participated 
in this study and found that she experienced "no changes whatsoever" aside 
from her initial bout of sickness and confusion immediately following the 
procedure. The study did not report any significant findings. They are now 
looking at brain scans of participants identifying as having BUD and hoping to 
discover more concrete findings. The sample they are currently working with on 
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the more recent portion of their research numbers only 4, and although they 
inform my participant Claire that they have discovered that the body imaging area 
as somewhat smaller in these people, the sample is hardly reportable. 
While some experiencing BUD retain hope that there may be a locatable 
neurological basis for this disorder, others insist that it is past due time that 
surgery (amputations or spinal cord dissection-to cause quadra or para paralysis) 
becomes a viable option. Thinking philosophically about the experience of BUD 
provokes another possibility for the answer to this particular mystery- that there 
will be no cure, (only treatment through the achieved solution of the person 
suffering via surgery, pretending, or another means) because it is a culturally 
influenced psychological disorder. People feeling the effects are not illegitimately 
doing so, but the disorder is likely one that does not have a particular genetic 
origin, as the lack of findings in the Ramachandran study suggest. 
All participants indicate that they have self-injured on one or more 
occasions but are not chronic self-injurers with the exception of the prison 
population. Most people who opt for a single major embodiment modification 
such as amputation or partial paralysis differ from chronic self-injurers in that they 
may self-injure once or twice in an attempt to inflict severe enough damage to 
remedy their embodiment crisis, but they do not repeatedly or demonstrably 
inflict injuries to punish, harm, control or save themselves as do self-mutilators 
(Favazza, 1987). Self-injury is discussed at length in chapter four. 
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A part of the reason BUD is frequently drawn parallel to GID is that the 
researcher of both phenomenoa is the same person (First). Through an overview 
of the literature and in speaking with patients it seems that BUD has more in 
common with GID (which is categorized in the DSM as a sexual 
disorder/dysfunction) than a somatoform disorder such as BDD because of the 
particular language used when expressing the illness experience. A major 
commonality between BUD and GID lies in the way patients explain their identity 
disconnect. There have been no marked neurological effects which support that 
either is a psycho neurological problem, but there is very strong qualitatative 
evidence that this is not simply a condition created by its sufferer's either. 
It is important to note that body modification practitioners do not usually 
identify themselves as suffering from BUD, and there are very significant 
differences between the groups, however there are also some commonalities 
which have emerged in my interviews. One of these common threads is the 
compatibility of the psychoanalytic mode of analysis to the embodiment 
experience of the sufferer. Another shared thread is the desire for new tactile or 
sensational experiences as a principle motivator for the (dis)embodiment 
experience (e.g.; phantom sensations) and a related hedonistic drive (or that 
resignation from hedonism as we would traditionally regard it through paralysis or 
amputation). 
This project will provide an exploration of some extreme embodiment 
troubles and highlight theoretical debates that surround them in discussing the 
works of Kristeva, Baudrillard and Butler as they pertain to the identity of the 
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contemporary subject. I will focus on the role of the internet, pretending, self-
injury and language as these themes relate to the illness experience of BUD 
sufferers and others who (desire to) inflict self-harm and explore these themes 
through a psychoanalytic lens. This will serve as the first comprehensive analysis 
of BUD within the discipline of sociology. 
(Introjection): 
After breaking a bone my foot was set in a plaster cast, which was 
burdensome and lumbering in addition to it being difficult to maneuver with 
crutches. I found it too hard to walk much and became reclusive, exhausted and 
not feeling up to socializing. One night it began to feel as if my foot and leg were 
swelling rapidly- trapped in the cast. I felt the circulation cutting out and a burning 
tight sensation making it frustrated yet numb. I was sweating and anxious. I did 
not tell anyone what I felt was happening to me, because I knew none of this was 
really happening; that it was a combination of intoxication- a few drinks on top of 
the pain medication- and my discomfort and reduction of mobility that was 
contributing to the feelings of panic and entrapment. Still, my panic rose. What if 
it had grown to the point at which I could no longer keep at bay the hysteria that 
was creeping into my thoughts? If I had logged online and found a 'broken foot 
community' blog and read that there were many others who suffered this feeling, 
that it lasted for almost everyone throughout the whole duration of their casting, 
and for many the rest of their lives (or at least long after the cast was removed); 
would I have dismissed these fellow sufferers as crazy? Would the fear that I 
would become 'crazy too' move me to remove the cast then and there? What if I 
9 
persisted to participate in this online identification and began to consider my 
hallucination a reality, one more common, more normal than I had ever 
imagined? What if I continued logging onto the website and the pain got worse: I 
found other forums and spent hours a day discussing my podiatric suffocation? It 
could become the focus of my life, and because it was the focus of my life, I 
could no longer stand to have the cast removed; who would I be without it? Let's 
say, in perfect irony that the cast became my crutch. I realized I suffered from a 
mental disorder and began advocating for treatment options; drugs, injections 
that temporarily paralyzed or killed off the nerves below my knee, amputation of 
the foot-anything to free me from my suffering, and simultaneously legitimize my 
identity. If I had known this was the alternative option would I have cut off my 
cast as soon as I realized this was a real problem, and forfeited my bones best 
recovery? If I had, I would have never known there were others who could share 
in my disability- that I was not alone, that I was not crazy, that I was part of a 
group for whom this was really happening. 
This may sound like an insane scenario, and of course only part of this 
story is true: I did feel trapped and panicked in a cast, and I quickly sobered and 
acknowledged that I was merely imagining, attributing my stress, hallucinating. I 
did not turn to the internet and amass a community of like sufferers in which to 
belong, but I do believe in the possibility for some people facing embodiment 
troubles to somehow find themselves in this disposition; to have had a 
fundamental experience with a person who has a disability and incorporate this 
into their developing psychology. This may lead them to medicalize their 
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emotions, their paranoia, their loneliness; to find company and simultaneously 
set themselves on a trajectory that seeks a radical, final solution. What else 
possesses the unprecedented power to amass, to network, to influence, than the 
internet? In reality many people find themselves in very dire and much more 
extreme versions of this tale. My informants' stories, their obsessive desires, their 
need for radical body modifications of their physically healthy bodies, like 
amputation and paralysis are the reason for this project. What makes them even 
more compelling is their insistence that their identity confusion is real and can be 




To date, there has not been a long-format sociological project dealing 
specifically with those who suffer BUD, or those who undertake more radical 
forms of body modification such as amputation. The internet provides numerous 
forums for such people to engage in the philosophical/sociological conversations 
coloring their situations, and this thesis attempts to highlight some of the themes 
emerging through these discussions and work as an inclusive theoretical frame 
through which to begin interrogating like embodiment troubles. 
Sample Recruitment: 
Participants in this research project were recruited either through mutual 
contacts, or by posting on message boards of a web-forum for people desiring a 
body modification (in the form of an amputation) or identifying as having Body 
Integrity Identity Disorder (BUD). The webmasters of two of such sites contacted 
me via e-mail and became participants in this research. Respondents were either 
contacted by e-mail or telephone to organize a meeting. The conversations 
lasted approximately two hours and proceeded through a series of emails, or 
meeting face-to-face. Identities were camouflaged by participants from the 
beginning, and any personally distinguishing information was disguised without 
compromising the accuracy or quality of the participant's statements. All 
participants were given the option to disclose their actual identity both to myself 
12 
and the readers of my paper, but only those who did not desire radical 
modifications of embodiment opted for this type of disclosure. This includes my 
'professional' interview subjects; a psychologist at a multi-level security 
corrections center, a practicing member of the Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons (plastics) and a body modifier who works in a professional studio 
setting. 
The total number of research participants for this project is 9, with the 
majority of focus surrounding conversations with the 4 main participants who 
identifying as having BUD or otherwise desiring a radical modification of 
embodiment. 
Characteristics of the Sample: 
Due to the troubled nature of this topic, three of my five central 
participants had already crafted precise concealment techniques for discussing 
themselves. As participants in online forums they use pseudonyms and are very 
careful not to reveal their specific locale, official job title or familial characteristics. 
They were still very willing to disclose their ages, the general region they inhabit 
and the basic quality of their careers, as one participant stated; 
"Sean O'Connor is a pseudonym. I am extremely cautious of my real 
identity, particularly as I've lived for nearly 12 years as a full time 
wheelchair user. Friends and colleagues know me as disabled, and if it 
came out that I'm not indeed disabled, the shit could hit the proverbial fan. 
Too much of a risk, not divulging that...In any case, as it is a pseudonym, 
you can, and I encourage you to use it. I have nothing to really hide. I 
have spoken enough and completely candidly about this on my blog. I 
change some details that would be too easy to identify me, but not that 
many." 
13 
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*While Adam does not identify as having BUD, he is heavily modified and represents the body modification 
sub-group 
Among my central interview participants, Martin has a DIY knee fusion 
(arthrodesis; the fusion of the femur and tibia which renders the knee immobile), 
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achieved through 8 years of living with a brace on his right knee, Claire and Sean 
desire to become paraplegics and live as "pretenders" spending much of their 
time in wheelchairs. Tobias desires an above the left knee amputation and plans 
to have one in the near future, Adam has had both of his earlobes removed, an 
ear bisected, numerous implants, piercings, tattoos and scarifications. He plans 
to amputate one of his digits. All except Adam identify themselves as suffering 
from BUD. 
The clinical or otherwise professional participants include Dr. Gaston 
Schwarz, a practicing fellow of The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Canada (plastics), Adam who, as well as being heavily modified, works as a body 
modification artist, and Jeff Earl, the psychology coordinator at a mixed security 
correctional institution. I have found that the expert analysis from the various 
professionals has enriched my understanding of the patient-clinician rhetoric 
above all else, additionally this somewhat rounded inventory of experts has 
served to improve my interview capabilities. 
Throughout this thesis, and particularly in chapter 2,1 draw on the 
autoethnographic approach using my own life-course experiences, and, more 
recently, my experiences with the plastic surgery system, having had the first 
surgery of a series of scar revisions (the result of a dog attack in July of 2007). I 
have been through the rounds of speaking with 6 different surgeons, all but one 
on multiple occasions, and have notably observed our interactions, making for an 
incredibly useful first-person experience with the workings of this type of medical 
system. I have read the transcripts of 12 interviews from broadcast (Soundprint, 
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2002) and televised (BBC, 2000) documentaries conducted by other researchers, 
and though I do not address them specifically they have been a valuable 
resource simply in observing their compatibility with my own findings. 
Procedure: 
I originally identified five groups who desired amputation, based on the 
literature and my own internet research into discussion forums and websites. I 
considered the population to include groups of those who one would call 
fetishists - those with an overtly sexually desire to be or to have sexual relations 
with an amputee (otherwise known as apotemnophilia), those people who 
suffered from a single seemingly random 'need' to become an amputee to match 
their 'true' identity (BUD), some people heavily into Body Modification practices 
(tattooing, scarification, suspension, etc..) where the amputation is typically more 
minor (fingers, toes) and is predominately described as an aesthetic choice, 
rather than a total and encompassing obsession. There are also chronic self-
injurers who eventually amputate; those who often haunt the corridors of mental 
institutions and disrupt the usual disorder of prisons, at times through a castration 
or other form of body modification. These voluntary amputees are typically 
slotted into the category of self-mutilator, and are often diagnosed as psychotic 
or delusional, still the extremity of their mutilation deserves closer and more 
specific examination. There are also examples of elective self-amputation to 
save oneself from literal entrapment (for example, in the case of a mountain 
climber trapped under a boulder) or that performed to solicit insurance (for 
example, a worker who 'looses' a finger on the job and receives various forms of 
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compensation), but these groups do not correspond thematically with my 
research. 
Image of a scarification done by Adam 
Whereas I had envisioned my thesis as a survey of the groups who desire 
voluntary amputation, I quickly discovered while requesting interview subjects by 
posting on discussion forums specifically speaking about amputation, that there 
were other forms of these imagined bodies. My first correspondence with Claire 
included the following statement: 
"Unfortunately you've written to the wrong person, as I don't desire an 
amputation. I desire to be a paraplegic. There is rampant, widespread 
misunderstanding about BUD on many levels, but one of the 
misunderstandings is that it's all about amputation. There are many, 
MANY people in the BUD community who desire paralysis, and to a lesser 
extent people who desire blindness or deafness. Unfortunately the media 
chooses to focus strictly on the amputation issue - probably because it's 
more shocking and graphic and more sensational value for them. But, as 
with most things, the reality is much different than the media would have 
you believe. I hope this doesn't come off as harsh. You find me very 
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unhappy with people doing studies and reports on BUD of late. I have 
been burned, and wasted MUCH time with people wanting to study or 
report on BUD who ultimately paint a sensationalist, negative and/or 
inaccurate picture of it". 
After reevaluating my direction I decided against specifically soliciting a 
representative for each of my previously defined groups. Instead, I chose to 
conduct open-ended semi-structured interviews with individuals who suffer 
different forms of BUD, as well as others who have body modifications on the 
extreme spectrum. The interviews often had the informant draw on evocative 
memories of their development of identity and sexuality. I very much appreciate 
emotional responses and was not looking for specific data. This provided a 
particular challenge when analyzing the responses I had gathered as an 
aggregate. Because the interviews were so open I did not necessarily ask all of 
the respondents the same questions. This was important for the natural flow of 
conversation, and it allowed themes as well as specific and parallel experiences 
to emerge through our dialogue. 
It is important to me that participants understand that their participation 
makes the research a cooperative process and that their individual voices 
emerge through the narrative we create. It is because of this partnership that I 
very much prefer interviews to be conducted in person. I must admit, however, 
that I did not find the interviews I conducted in person to be necessarily richer 
than those articulated via e-mail. The overall openness of participants and the 
quality of their responses were not hindered by the form our communication took. 
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This came as a bit of surprise, but then, anonymity is often a catalyst for most 
honestly expressing oneself. 
The interviews were conducted throughout the spring of 2008. They 
focused around both the practical components of the participants experience with 
their specific embodiment troubles as well as the theoretical insights they offered 
into their personal experience, and the experiences of others suffering from 
similar experiences. I discovered that BUD sufferers are an outspoken yet 
officially silenced group. What I mean by this is, although their voices remain 
largely within the margins (the majority of people, including therapists and 
physicians have never encountered their specific problems), or are relegated to 
the digital realm (internet discussion forums) they are strongly versed on the 
issues surrounding their predicament, have formulated firm opinions and are 
staunch advocates for their "disability's" recognition and treatment. Of course my 
informants are advocates, and we must consider that there are more suffering 
from BUD who would not come forth to participate in my research, or be quoted in 
a Newsweek article (Sean) or participate in the research of Ramachandran and 
McGeoch (Claire). This does not serve as a substantial limitation in my opinion, 
as their position as de-facto leaders has enabled them to speak with hundreds 
upon hundreds of other sufferers as well as inform their knowledge with all of the 
available sources. On at least three occasions I was recommended academic 
readings to enrich my understanding of the issues by research participants. This 
was a necessarily humbling experience and made the research experience a 
more genuine exploration for me. 
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Interviewing these participants was a truly invaluable experience both on a 
personal and professional level. Their probing intellect, sense of humor, and 
willingness to self-reflect made the research process a journey of mutual self-
discovery. The apparent absurdity of BUD was not lost on participants who 
empathized with my confused and at times misdirected questions; they were 
empathetic and helpful and truly made this research a collaboration. On several 
occasions Claire and Sean expressed dismay with the way their words had been 
usurped in the past by researchers and journalists who present an inaccurate 
portrait of BUD and my hope for this project was to represent them as fairly and 
accurately as possible without compromising the critical nature of the inquiry I 
intend to craft. 
I feel that if this goal was realized it was in part because of my ability to 
interrogate my own experience of embodiment troubles and however different, 
parallel them in some sense to the experiences of my participants. 
Limitations: 
Due to my small number of participants I cannot begin to purport a 
representative sample. I still believe that this research is valuable, not only in its 
innovation, but for the quality of conversation this minimal sample has allowed. 
Interview participants were truly candid and qualitatively expressive; this has led 
to rich content which aids in the avoidance of generalizations. As my research 
was primarily motivated by an absence of bodies in embodiment theory, and the 
application of contemporary theory to specific real-world examples of seemingly 
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new embodiment troubles, I do not consider the inclusion of such a small number 
of individuals problematic. I had access to a plethora of other interview scripts 
with like participants and did observe congruencies which supported my research 
themes. However, because I approached my interviews and their analysis as 
specific case studies of informants, I did not find it particularly helpful to draw on 
specific examples from these alternative interview scripts. 
This project is partially structured by a psychoanalytic framework, which 
works as a limitation because informants were often asked to draw on their 
memories to answer questions. I doubt very much that this is any more of a 
limitation than the interview model in origin, it is always nearly impossible to 
discern fact from fiction, but this is what makes for charmingly enigmatic 
research. 
This project is very much an exploratory study which provides an overview 
of these kinds of embodiment troubles and highlights some of the philosophical 
debates that surround them. It is also an exploration of theory- of using the 
writing of Kristeva, Baudrillard and Butler and the insights they provide to both 
explain and be challenged by the phenomena I discuss. This is the first long-
format analysis of BUD, and a first within the discipline of sociology. 
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II 
My Embodiment Trouble: 
I have certainly experienced all of the usual hurdles in finishing this 
project, and some less than usual. As I sit here pondering this thesis, looking 
back on the quickly dissolving semesters behind, I now see that my struggle has 
proven to be one of my most compelling research resources. You see, in July of 
2007,1 was attacked by a standard breed poodle, and the result was a rather 
intense trip to the ER and a disfigured upper lip and moderate keloid scar. Since, 
the scar has healed quite well and I have had the first of a series of surgeries to 
revise the lip. 
The event was a quite literal enacting of a traumatic climax within 
Kristeva's Powers of Horror and often reminds me of that patient of Freud's, Little 
Hans (whom Kristeva also discusses), who fears the horse, and in particular, the 
horse's mouth. Though for Freud Hans's fear is manifest of his inarticulabie 
castration anxiety, and for Kristeva it is the symbolic power of the object of 
phobic desire, a "hieroglyph that condenses all fears" (Kristeva, 34), my 
experience saw no original symbolic interaction, but the very real fleshy 
intersection of subject and (beast) object through which the loathed object (the 
dog), emerging from this sadistic canine experience, became encompassed by 
my disfigured lip itself. I, in some sense and for some time, became a living 
metaphor for that disfigurement that was my lip. Likewise, my informants who 
suffer BUD, apotemnophilia, BDD, or whichever signifier you select, are so wholly 
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consumed with the body part in question that this part becomes not only the 
object of desire, the desire to destroy that loathed appendage usurps a healthy 
subjectivity for the person in question. Their limb or the desired form for their 
body, becomes the universe of their experience. After the attack my initial 
reaction was of that savior shock, which prevents the trauma from loading the 
foreground of our thoughts. Later, repeated intrusive thoughts of dog attacks and 
specifically of the dog mouth biting occupied much of the life of my mind. To 
speak in the language of Kristeva or of Lacan before her, the subject confronted 
with the Object (other) also confronts the other (his ego) or "objet petit a": the 
abject. 
The specifics of my injury and the trauma of its occurrence are not 
necessarily what motivates my desire to better understand the complex relations 
my informants are going through, both within their own psychology and in 
society. Rather, my new found presence in the community of those whose 
primary concern is aesthetic enhancement (I had at least two appointments with 
six different plastic surgeons before deciding on one, as well as assessments 
with general practitioners and therapists), and, moreover my newly minted 
belonging in a body (a face) that was foreign to my developed schema of what I 
look like, that was quite profound. The experience of a separation between the 
body as an imagined whole and its fragmented parts is an essential component 
of the infant's development of the ego. Alienation results when what one is and 
what one desires their physical image to reflect are discordant. Through my 
accident I was able to interpret the feeling of discomfort with one's own body 
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from a subjective perspective, one which was not the experience of the usual 
embodiment woes (loose weight, hate nose, e tc . ) , in that it included 
involvement with facets of the medical system in which most of my informants 
are well-versed. 
There were also, of course, some very large and essential differences; I 
do not connote to have shared an experience with any of my participants. To 
begin, all of our experiences can only ever share particular ideas and factors, 
and are very much subjective. My problem was an unwanted injury and the 
resulting trauma and treatment, I doubt nearly as complex an embodiment 
difficulty suffering BUD. I was also able to easily access surgery to 'fix' my 
problem, a surgery that is covered by Medicare when performed in a public 
hospital. I was able to skip on the scrutiny with which some doctors evaluate their 
patients eligibility for plastic surgery. I was seen as a victim of one of life's 
unfortunate twists and every doctor I spoke with was kind, sensitive and willing to 
be very accommodating. This has not been the situation for my informants, 
something I already know through research. I gain insights into this fact through 
my conversation with Dr. Schwarz, and through an exchange I share with Sean 
over e-mail in which I discuss my injury and treatment: 
"Every time I hear something about such surgeries, I think to myself that 
it's quite unfair. Surgery to improve a scar left by a dog bite is, arguably, 
merely an aesthetic thing. Obviously, some dog bites leave faces and 
body ravaged and surgery can fix that, but in general, such bites don't 
result in lasting emotional ill-being...I'll admit to envy. One simple 20 
minute procedure would take care of 35 plus years of emotional agony. 
Heck, one injection of phenol in my spinal cord would be even faster than 
20 minutes, and less costly than a spinal cord transection. But that is 
denied to me. And so I envy those who can get plastic surgery to fix 
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scars, or to enlarge breasts, or to suck fat out...I am angered, enraged, at 
the medical community". 
I agree with Sean to some extent. Of course embodiment troubles are 
subjective experiences and we can never really know precisely how someone 
else experiences them, but I can imagine how what I felt could be elevated to 
extreme proportions. At the same time I am amused by the tendency for most of 
my informants to identify others' embodiment troubles as somehow more socially 
or psychologically problematic than their own: that the desire for cosmetic 
surgery reflects a sick, twisted social ideal. This is articulated in the following 
passage from my conversation with Adam; 
"We live in a really, really sick society. I mean the sick cannot be treated 
and people are sick because their bodies aren't the way they need them, 
or they're not the way they should be, or they feel they should be. And 
they are not being treated, and the people who are being treated are 
eighteen year olds getting nose jobs, because they want to look like the 
girl on the cover of a magazine. I mean, that's where the sickness is, and 
their parents should be prosecuted, they're the ones, for not bringing up 
their children right. I mean, not those who have a dissociation with their 
body parts." 
When Adam sympathizes with people who have"dissociation with their 
body parts", he is referring to people who feel the need to elect to become 
amputees. Adam and Sean both cast judgment on the system of conventional 
plastic surgery, which allows candidates to make what they consider aesthetic 
choices governed by unrealistic social standards for beauty, that these fonns of 
desire for transformation are of less conviction than someone who feels the need 
to match their body to their mind in an unconventional manner through radical, 
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unsanctioned body modification. I feel that Sean is putting me into this category 
and my resistance to that order forces the realization that I too am judging these 
plastic surgery clients as somehow less worthy than myself. This is a 
consideration I continue to ponder as I prepare for my next operation in 
September. I wonder how many procedures it will entail until my lip is rendered 
as close to pre-injury as possible- until it is no longer officially 'deformed', and 
whether more surgeries transfer my status from reconstructive to cosmetic. As 
often as I ponder the ethics of plastic surgery, I am not exempt from being caught 
up in the kind of rhetoric that values a hierarchy of acceptability and necessity for 
plastic surgeries . I reply to Sean,"/ know my desire to have my lip returned as 
much as possible to its natural state is far less significant or debilitating than your 
desire to become paralyzed". He responds: 
"But what would it have become, if left unaddressed for 35+ years, 
decades where you needed to have your lip "fixed", and where surgeons 
weren't willing to help? Would/could it have grown to the point where you 
could not endure it, or yourself, anymore? Rhetorical question, obviously, 
but one worth considering." 
This prompts me to remember that over the past year almost every time 
someone would ask me about my lip I would tell them I was to be operated on, 
subtly assuring them that I would look better, don't worry about me, I won't 
always look this way. My response was also motivated by hope that I would 
eventually look better, knowing that logic dictated that I would, that this glaring 
little mound that drew so much attention would be remedied. This belief kept me 
together through all the horrible encounters and penetrating stares. I cannot 
count how many times I thought; no one around me knows exactly how this feels. 
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When I look back on my writing I am taken aback by the darkness of that 
psychological space from which I have finally emerged. Had I not had this pretty 
facile experience with accessing surgery once the wait was over, what would my 
story now be? Would my embodiment trouble have become a complete 
obsession akin to that of Sean or Tobias? In my interview with Dr. Schwarz I tell 
him about the sense of injustice that pervades my informants opinion of the 
plastic surgery field, that they feel tremendous frustration that comes from 
feeling like they should not only be permitted to do something, but that they are a 
more valid candidate than the people who are free to do it. He responds: 
7 can fully understand and sympathize their frustration at the of lack of 
attention from our specialty, perhaps, simply because it is a very 
complicated issue, it's not simple at all. Today we live in a society that is 
fast and super specialized. So, nobody wants to take the time to listen to 
these people and their serious concerns... and their problems are labor 
intensive. So you say, you just go to a clinic that deals with their 
problem... and I recognize it. I recognize that it's our fault to some extent, 
making them frustrated. In other words we recognize that it's a serious 
problem, it takes an awfully long time to deal with these patients, so, you 
know, you let them be handled by experts who are more interested in the 
problem". 
I imagine that Sean and others would be even more frustrated if they knew 
that Schwarz considers their problem one of BDD, and does not recognize what 
appears to be their primary goal, that is, the validation of BUD as a 'real disability' 
(and the choices that might stem from that recognition). Still, Schwarz's empathy 
comes as somewhat of a surprise to me. I am accustomed to "transabled" people 
dictating stories of clinicians being shocked, rude, dismissive, repulsed and 
impossible to negotiate with. For most people, accessing cosmetic or 
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reconstructive surgery it is a simple task. I do not intend to underpay the ethics of 
surgeons, which vary from physician to physician, but where large sums of 
money are involved a little doctor shopping may be all that is required to access 
any operation. In my situation, I did not have to go to any lengths to conceal my 
motivation for surgery, or to say precise things to camouflage the extent of an 
obsession. I was looked at as a different type of patient and I was treated a little 
differently. There were looks of sympathy and overt kindness. Receptionists 
chatted with me a little longer and a general sense of poor girl in an unfortunate 
circumstance was the overall feel. 
My experience in the streets of everyday life lacked whatever reserve or 
sympathy I was treated to within waiting room walls. I was completely stunned by 
the number of people who would approach me, sometimes on a daily basis, and 
ask me what had happened to my lip. I still wonder how they could be so blunt as 
to interrogate me without knowing whether my appearance was one I had since 
birth, or one that would ever be altered. On two separate occasions I was even 
subject to a complete stranger approaching me and touching my lip. I frequently 
wondered if people with major disfigurements had to deal with the same kind of 
intrusive attention I was becoming so accustomed to. I was beginning to 
understand how unsettling it was to be in a foreign form, to empathize with what 
it might feel like to look, simply put, 'as you shouldn't'. I felt as though my face, 
my identity, was wrenched from me and this became, temporarily, all that 
mattered to me. When that small portion of my face was changed my body image 
as it had always been imagined was changed. On the other hand, I was aghast 
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at how anyone with a normal embodiment could ever want their body to become 
disabled, to make the conscious choice to become disabled or disfigured, if only 
because of the visibility, the stares, the questions. Or was this the seed of their 
motivation? Perhaps it was because my disfigurement was mild that people felt it 
was easy enough to approach me about it. Perhaps people in wheelchairs or 
amputees are privy to a sort of unspoken and constant observation that I imagine 
is far worse. 
The period of adjustment to the new way I looked was tedious and is on-
going. I now look different than I did before, and after the attack, and after six 
months waiting for surgery, and after the first surgery. I look different than I will 
after the next operation. This ebbing, (however subtle in my case) process at 
least gives me points of reflection and marked observation that are 
demonstrative of the embodiment trouble experience. 
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Ill 
Embodiment Troubles, Self Injury: 
I remember when I was in junior high school on the cusp of Kurt Cobain's 
suicide (which was a profound pop-cultural landmark for many of my generation), 
there was a cutting trend. These cuts did not present very serious danger, they 
were all superficial wounds, but there was a coolness (now, how profoundly 
regrettable) that a thin red streak along the inside of the wrist could elicit that was 
unmatched. Ever since this formulative experience, I have always been 
fascinated by the phenomenon of self-harm, the marking of a trend, of hating 
oneself, of fitting into an identity (or whatever else it may be), onto the flesh. I 
wonder about the stimulus: is it pain or release, adrenaline or desperation? What 
are the possible mingling qualities that provoke the act of cutting, and where and 
when do they finally end? While I consider cutting the body, body modifications 
(as part of the body modification subculture), and people with BUD or 
apotemnophilia all different phenomena in many important ways, their mutual 
self-injury and physical transformation may be qualified by the term embodiment 
troubles. 
Over the past few years my interest in this sort of ritualistic marking of the 
flesh was again refreshed. While backpacking through Bolgatanga in the 
northwestern region of Ghana just south of Burkina Faso, my travel companion, 
Kelly, and I stay the night with a family whose son we had met at the market. 
Okino's family live in a rat infested ghetto, and although our room is cozy and 
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neat, the sound of fat rats sliding around the patch tin roof all night was enough 
to keep us from sleeping at all. The following night we opt for a hostel, but we still 
spent time with the family, and their children became our tour guides for the 
remaining few days. One of these children, Sara, knows some English and is a 
kind and gentle spirit. We share looks over our very suave new friend Okino and 
this expedites our friendship. Sarah brings Kelly and I over to her house so that 
she can braid Kelly's hair, and on that day we met Sara's baby and realize that 
although we considered her a little girl, she is a woman in some very critical 
ways. Sara is only 15, but has the care of her own 6-month-old daughter to 
attend to. While I know Sara loves her child, she does not seem ready to be a 
mother. She passes off the baby at any chance she is given and seems 
frightened and daunted by her presence. When it is time to feed the child she 
pulls down her top and her tiny breast is covered by a lace bra. I ask her about it 
and she says that it is a gift from the baby's father. I ask her where the baby's 
father is and she shrugs. For the hours she is braiding Kelly's hair I take her 
baby, play with her, hold her and my much heartier frame is tired and I want to 
rest. I feel badly now for thinking that she was passing off the child so easily. 
While I had become accustomed to the rituals of scarring in Ghana: the 
common tribal distinction shared by most of its population is a hook shaped scar 
underneath the eye on one or both cheekbones, I notice markings on Sara's 
baby that are quite different. Around the baby's neck, wrists and ankles are 
dozens of small slash scars, about one inch in length and thin as a razorblade. 
Most appear to be months old, but some are newer. I ask Sara why her child is 
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cut up so badly and she replies that she had been sick with a very bad fever so 
they carved her up to let out bad blood. Panicked, I try to explain to Sara that she 
needs to take her baby to the government hospital whenever she gets sick and 
that bloodletting is not a cure that works. I try to show her how a baby does not 
have as much blood to loose and that it causes a lot of unnecessary pain for her 
little body. I plead her understanding and am visibly worried. She says that she 
knows it is not good, but that she must listen to those who take care of her, and 
she shrugs her shoulders. 
I am upset but not naive. I have been working in this country for months 
with HIV positive patients, some the most far-gone and unhealthy people I have 
ever seen. They come to the hospital without a shot at ever surviving longer than 
a few months: man and woman leaving farm and family of fifteen to bring their 
barely incased bones to a test that will only verify what we can all already see. I 
now know how to look at someone and know they are well into a battle with 
AIDS: there is a sallow expression that is not like any other hollow cheeks, there 
is the glaze in the eyes. It is as though their skeleton has become a vacuum, 
sucking all flesh into a pit of nothing. Ever count the teeth of someone unable to 
muster a grin? I think, this is a land (in many ways) of suffering. A suffering 
different from our own, void somehow of our lonely melancholia- that which feeds 
hordes of new mood disorders and somatoform disabilities- but one that is 
profoundly burdened by a legacy of endless struggle. Of all this, there is 
something about those abject limbs of Sara's little girl that shake me right down 
deep. It was the best laid plan, the making of a better life, the intention that was 
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so misplaced. There I was, the animated Obruni (colloquial expression for white 
person which translates loosely to 'on the horizon', as in ships on the horizon 
which were the first signs of whites coming to the Gold Coast to initiate the 
African slave trade), sprung alive by the struggle to explain infection and 
antibiotics to fifteen year old Sara, hips so skinny it was a wonder she didn't 
crack in two when she brought this fat and now healthy, scarred and grinning life 
into the world. Sara in the rat ghetto. Sara who Okoni told me that she works as a 
prostitute. Sara who was doing what any young woman put upon by a world that 
did not care for her might do to survive, to fill her hungry daughter's stomach. I 
want to take their scars and make them disappear. They are beginning to look 
like shackles on this dear baby's wrists and ankles. I am urgent and want to 
make Sara understand that her intuition was and will be right; that she needs to 
do what she knows is right because it is her child, but I am an ironic, laughable 
thing on the horizon trying desperately to import my knowing, even though I see 
that our ways are not helping, they are afraid of touching, they are not healing. 
Our ways are talking to the rich Blacks at the Universities and making 
ethnographies about it. I am enraged, but I suddenly want only to crumple and 
disappear. I am exhausted and within a few days malaria's heavy sick fog will 
have hung itself over my bones and I will feel justified to sink into myself, that just 
resolve of the illness experience. But right now I want only to tell her in a 
language she might understand- please, please, bend, but do not break to the 
thin and endless sting of your struggle. 
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I move to Montreal and meet a new friend who has carved his arms over 
the past four years into birch tree branches. Smooth white scars circling round 
and round. New cuts are red and freshly bleeding. His is one of the most extreme 
cases of self-injury I have witnessed. He says the pain makes him pass out so 
that he can fall asleep. A year later he tells me that his mother also chronically 
cut herself and eventually killed herself and that his grandfather cut off one of his 
fingers; "It was after the German occupation of Alsace during World War II and 
he said 'the Nazi's made me to if". He makes me wonder whether there is a 
biological determinant to this type of psychological or identity problem. His is 
certainly not the only case of morbidity. My cousin is working at a group home in 
Ottawa where every single female resident is a "cutter". Razors and knives are 
not allowed. She tells me about one time when she was in training, someone 
shouted to her to bring towels and when she entered the room she saw one of 
the girls lying in a pool of blood. She had likely not meant to, but had gone fatally 
far. 
On a spring break trip to Mexico I discover that my friend and bunkmate 
has scars covering his stomach and chest. He sees me looking at them while we 
swim, but I do not ask him why and he does not tell me. So, it is psychological, 
cultural, social, it may be biological. It seems that they are all letting something 
out, some sickness, and wearing the signs. 
Through all of this I remember Sara's little girl. I have several photographs 
of them; in one Sara is holding the baby and they are two small things. I realize 
that her baby has her ears pierced and that she also has a scar across one of 
her eyelids. A sadness that is at once striking and lingering emanates from 
Sara's eyes, but her baby looks at peace, eyes closed, sleeping and smiling. 
Some children can forget the pain with which they are afflicted. While others 
break, they bend like we cannot imagine. 
Cutters are not only relegated to institutions, though within institutions 
(mental, correctional) this form of body modification is one that is unmatched. 
Morbidity can live within the walls of a family home, of a village or within a prison. 
The question of whether cutting leads to more severe forms of mutilation is one 
with an answer that is multifaceted. Considering my informants, the presence of 
these kinds of embodiment troubles (cutting, scarification) do not necessarily 
lead to more severe desires for modifications, but do frequently evolve into other 
acts of more radical self-harm. For Adam, cutting was an introduction to the 
multitudes of modifications he would come to engage in, including the cutting off 
of body parts. For Tobias, who strongly desires the removal of his leg, he never 
cut or otherwise self-harmed because he recognized that it would not bring him 
the result he desires. There is not a necessary trajectory from cutting to more 
severe modification among the BUD group, but amongst the body modification 
subculture and amongst institutionalized populations of those who self harm 
there seems to be a strong link. 
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Embodiment Troubles in Institutions: 
I am lighted as to how significantly institutional the manifestation of this 
particular form of embodiment trouble (cutting) is through my conversation with 
Jeff Earl, the coordinator of psychology at a correctional institution who has 
worked in the field for 25 years. I begin my conversation with Jeff by discussing 
the debate over naming the embodiment trouble I am predominantly researching-
BIID (aka, transabled, apotemnophilia, wannabe) and ask, from his clinical 
perspective, how important coming to a consensus on the name of a particular 
disorder is: 
7 tend to look at it from more of a behavioral perspective... labeling the 
behaviors isn't overly helpful. Looking at what maintains the behavior is 
much more important. Is it being done for attention, because there are 
body distortion problems, or a variety of different things- so what we 
usually try to do, is try and understand what things are supporting the 
behavior and putting interventions into place to reduce the behavior or 
stop it." 
This is a very practical approach suited to the prison environment where 
the threshold for treatment before a condition worsens is expedited, and I 
recognize that the question I pose is quite philosophical. The power given by a 
name though, is one that maintains even in the chaotic confines of a prison. 
There are a variety of reasons that the naming or diagnosis is of particular 
importance within a prison: 
"One of the problems is that there are lot of the guys we have in here who 
are having mental health problems, but they do not have Axis 1 disorders 
that would be treated in a mental health facility and in the community, so 
they really fall through the cracks in terms of society and mental health 
strategies. They have to end up in prisons". 
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The inmates Jeff speaks of have not been formally diagnosed with a 
mental illness. When an inmate is diagnosed s/he is eligible for better treatment 
than someone who remains under the radar, still diagnoses may be problematic 
for different reasons; non-necessity, inaccuracy, or as ammunition for an inmate 
to make particular demands and access particular medications that they may sell 
or abuse. 
Accessibility to information is a problem faced by staff in corrections 
services and this limits the amount of care being offered to inmates, whose 
numbers already strain the insufficient mental health resources available: 
"Basically when people come in, in some cases we have a lot of 
information, and in others we have little. A lot of times people will go to 
their family doctor and they may have a diagnosis like bi-polar disorder 
and be on anti-depressants, or attention deficit disorder... In some cases 
the diagnosis is fairly questionable, and in other cases people have gone 
through an in-patient placement and had a pretty thorough 
examination...The other difficulty is that we need the offenders consent to 
get medically confidential information. So, we go through a lot of efforts to 
try and get information about mental status, but it is very difficult to get..." 
At the prison where Jeff is employed there are 450 inmates, but because it 
is the regional reception centre there is large and constant turnover and they 
receive over 500 new inmates each year. Of these offenders, Jeff estimates that 
25% are on some sort of psychotropic medication, and even more are having 
"some sort of mental health difficulties". This high ratio of medicated inmates 
does not come as a surprise: our culture in general is at a high point with respect 
to the use of psychotropic and enhancement medicines and institutional usage 
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reflects the situation of the wider culture. Inasmuch as prisons work as 
microcosms for society as a whole, problems such as cutting or slashing are 
present on a level that does not correlate, and there are a variety of reasons why 
prisons are a hot bed for such types of behavior. Within a prison emotions may 
be heightened to extremes (or numb beyond belief). Cutters or slashers of all 
varieties find that sometimes if they can focus on physical pain, it takes away 
from their emotional pain. Self-injury results from someone's inability to manage 
their emotions. Some may be overwhelmed by situational factors: put in 
segregation and utterly depressed and angry, denied a parole, their partner 
breaks up with them...they are upset and angry at themselves, so they slash. 
Some people will use self harm as a tool for manipulation, something prison 
employees are very much aware of: "There are power and control issues...you 
have to be careful because sometimes there is a pay off and you have to be 
aware. Someone may be trying to get put in (mental health care facility, 
rehabilitation area) because they have drug debts, for example". There are 
others who are completely delusional: "We had one gentleman who thought that 
he was in a reality TV show and slashed because he thought the show would 
have to stop the program". 
While I imagine most mental illnesses have symptoms which are 
aggravated in a prison setting, Dr. Armando Favazza discusses two which are 
particularly related to imprisonment; antisocial personality disorder, 
characterized by compulsive, aggressive, hostile behavior, which is made worse 
"when placed in a restrictive prison setting" (Favazza, 111), and borderline 
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personality disorder as "the only mental illness in which, according to the official 
psychiatric nomenclature, the occurrence of physically self-damaging acts is a 
major diagnostic cr/fer/on"(Favazza, 110). Jeff finds that there are "more and 
more people with emotional deregulation and impulse control problems, people 
who have borderline personality disorder traits". This serves as a valid 
explanation for the number of patients who chronically self harm. For these 
people, dialectical behavior therapy-an approach to help people take their mind 
off negative thoughts and balance extreme emotions- seems to have a lot of 
promise, according to Jeffs experience: Borderline patients are a "very resistant, 
very difficult treatment group" and a "significant percentage end up killing 
themselves eventually". 
The frequency and type of self-harm going on in institutions varies. 
Favazza has written about more extreme forms of self-harm in prisons including 
castration and amputation. In the following passage Jeff tells of the various forms 
of mutilation he has encountered in his careen 
"Cutting is most common, we have certainly have seen other people who 
have burned...one man use to wrap his arms in bags and light them on 
fire... inserting objects in eyelids- things like staples. We have had people 
in Atlantic institution that have cut off toes and fingers...never here 
though...We certainly had people who would self-mutilate with behaviors 
that could very well cause death. We had one gentleman that would 
repeatedly injure his genitals and his lower body, his intestines and 
stomach, he would basically jab things in there and even when he was 
restrained all the time. At one point he used a stand from his IV to 
basically poke in there (stomach) and damage his internal organs." 
The frequency with which such behavior arises varies, as Jeff most aptly 
describes, "It is a continuum with different topologies within that continuum". 
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Minor cutting is entirely common and likely occurs on a daily basis, while the 
other more extreme and difficult to perform behaviors are more rare. Jeffs team 
sends around three inmates to the treatment centre, a mental health facility 
(under law), per month, "usually because of concerns about suicide". 
Dr. Armando Favazza's writing on self-mutilation and body modification 
comes from three decades of extensive clinical experience as a cultural 
psychiatrist. He indicates that, as with other mutilations, the desire to lose one's 
limb may be a reflection of castration anxiety and other libidinal confusions, as a 
borderline or schizoid impulse, or as a specific non-psychotic assertion 
influenced by the transference of a traumatic experience otherwise unrelated 
(1986). In reading through some of Favazza's case studies I was struck with the 
possibility that the first sight awakening (the point of reference for their desire is 
often an early childhood experience with a disabled person) often relayed by 
those desiring disability may directly correspond to a traumatic developmental 
experience, occurring at approximately the same time. The transference of this 
experience into the perceived foreignness or loathing of the body part(s) in 
question may be forgotten by the individual suffering the embodiment trouble, 
and come to be understood only as a profound and integral part of their identity. 
If their psycho-trauma is so centered on their embodiment, their newly achieved 
sense of wholeness and satisfaction upon the realization of the disability (for 
those few who acquire their desire) may speak to a greater peace of mind found 
through abolishing the symbol of their trauma and disorder. The complex sexual 
metaphors found through looking at clinical cases of self-mutilation as told by 
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Favazza and Jeff share common points with the ordeals of other people 
discussed in this project who desire to physically harm themselves towards 
whatever conclusion. 
Self-Injury In BHD Respondents: 
This section deals in particular with self-injury as it relates to the BUD 
informant, specifically as an attempt to inflict some degree of the disabled 
condition they desire. In the media there have been articulations by amputees 
who have solicited necessary removal of their limb by a surgeon through either 
purposefully inducing gangrene via the application of dry ice, through shooting 
the leg, cutting it with a chainsaw (Gilbert, 2003), and even from sitting beside 
railroad irons. As Claire describes, it is not enough for most people with BUD to 
pretend, they "need to need" the chair, the crutches, the braces. She describes 
this as more than a psychological need or longing, but an actual physical need. It 
is evident that the body does not require the change in form to survive, in fact, 
the change in form is a difficult and compromising shock to the body. It is the 
psychological drives and desires that so poignantly create the need which makes 
acts of self-injury desirable. Even when the BUD sufferer has talked themselves 
out of self-injury they still hold belief in the possibility of someday acquiring their 
desired form. Tobias is an example of someone who has worked through a low 
point and talked himself out of taking such action: 
"I was really close to doing something -shoving the leg under a bus- about 
twelve years or so ago but a really bad nightmare the day before I had 
decided to "do the deed" prevented me. I considered trying to get rid of a 
toe or two as that would be so much easier and with less risk involved but 
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as I felt that would really do nothing to solve my problem with the leg I 
decided against it." 
Of all my interview subjects, the one who seems to be the most at risk 
for severe self injury or suicide is Sean. Sean has been living in utter desperation 
for a very long time. He has undergone several traumatic experiences related to 
his BUD in the past, including being raped by his therapist as a teenager while 
living in Montreal. He also seems to be the most obsessive about his condition. 
Sean is the webmaster of a daily up-dated blog forum for people with BUD. He 
often posts reactions to other peoples frequently cruel blog posts about BUD. His 
utterly compelling obsession leads him to search out this damaging content, 
setting himself up for a lot of abuse, thus, the sadistic nature of BUD. Sean has 
hinted several times that he will likely seek out the "only other solution" (suicide) 
to his BUD. While he reaches staggering lows and often contemplates suicide he 
has physically self-injured only once in the past: 
"I did attempt self injury once. Tied a 2"x4" to my back and "fell" 
backwards from a ladder. I bruised my back, gave myself nerve pains in 
the right leg that lasted a couple months, and that was it. I vowed at the 
time never to try self-injury again, but now, I'm not so sure. I'm desperate 
enough to try again, if I found a way that I could rely on." 
According to Dr. First, BUD is a typically male disorder (Gilbert, 2003) and 
a very aggressive disorder. Claire's experience is unique for this reason, and 
also reflects conventional gender stereotypes. Her experience with self-injury 
reflects feminine gender performativity, both in method (more passive) and in that 
she describes it as not so much stemming from the BUD, but from the guilt of not 
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really needing her chair- for "lying". Claire has a guilty ego. Throughout the hours 
we spend together she frequently comments on feeling guilty about one thing or 
another. Guilt is another reason Claire feels so impassioned to believe that BUD 
is a neurological disorder. Of the interview participants, she is mostly firmly 
rooted to this belief and she expresses it often. She believes wholly in the validity 
of the McGeoch and Ramachandran research and carries a note from them 
explaining that they believe BUD to be a neurological condition, in case she may 
need it again in an emergency situation to explain her case, as with her instance 
of self-injury: 
"...At first I said that I had back trouble, which was true so I wasn't really 
lying to people...and using a wheel chair for that is quite an 
exaggeration...its really something very common -at first that was 
explained and as I started to use the chair more frequently-l was kind of 
searching for a long time, really feeling like I couldnt lie anymore, 
researching different disabilities and conditions- how do I say this- how do 
I explain to people without lying but without telling the whole truth more 
than I was comfortable revealing. I lighted upon (condition), and now 
that is what I say. I started saying that and almost the exact same time, 
when I started saying that, I said that I had gone to see a doctor in 
and I came home and said, Well, I went to see a doctor, and at home they 
were not able to diagnose me properly, and that I went to see a 
neurologist in the States and they said that I had (condition)'. And 
around the same time I started saying I had / saw how I could cause 
a genuine case of . Online. I was really, really desperate to achieve-l 
knew there was no way I could make myself a paraplegic - that it is too, 
too dangerous and It was also really drastic as far as I couldn't take care 
of my family like that, and I couldn't do that. So I was really desperate to 
attain a disability that would give me some relief from the BUD and allow 
me to more legitimately use the chair and without lying to people. I got the 
supplies from the internet and pharmacy ...and I was really scared and it 
was really hard. At first I had the needles for a few months and.. .1 kind of 
scared myself and I put them away for a long time and then I got them out 
again and I really needed to cause this disability. So it was kind of hit or 
miss, because you've got the needle and this expanse of skin and you've 
got to find the nerve so you have to identify the nerve by pain. And it's 
really, really excruciating pain, and it's really hard. At first I didn't even 
think I'd be able to insert the needle into the skin and I practiced and got 
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really good at that. ..My plan actually was to do a lot more than I did, I was 
going to do one nerve and one on the other side and move further up. I 
was really going to make it so I needed my chair for most situations. For 
some reason needing the chair more than just psychologically seems to 
be a big part of it for a lot of people. I don't know why that is. It's more than 
just pretending, it's needing the chair- another thing all together. More 
than psychologically, needing to physically need the chair. Physically. 
Like, to not be able to get by without it. That's not what happened though. 
Because, I did this leg, this lower leg, and it just absolutely hurt really bad 
when I injected it, and after I injected it and it just really got numb. A week 
and a half paralyzed and it just felt so good. So I had these (leg braces) 
and it made it so I could not flex my foot, my foot was just floppy for more 
like 3 weeks, but since I was already wearing these braces, and if I had 
the brace on it made absolutely no difference how I walked and I was 
thrilled at the weakness, at the lack of sensation, of feeling like my foot 
was half paralyzed- and it was great It was like it felt like that was how it 
was meant to be, for some reason, a relief, And it wasn't like sexual relief, 
like I got a charge out of it- it just felt right. It felt normal. But the problem 
was I started getting nerve pain after that...shooting pain and weird 
sensations, really painful. I got to the point where / couldn't sleep at night 
because I never knew pain like that existed...it was worse than natural 
child birth, and I've had 2...I had to go to the emergency room and 
because they could see the injection marks on my leg I had to tell them..." 
Claire describes this experience as "a new low point in my entire life." Her 
marriage began to increasingly unravel, and she does not trust that it will sustain. 
She is still dealing with nerve pain, but is now on a medication that helps to 
control it. However, she claims that: 
"Now that it is done and behind me, I do not regret it. One of the major 
things for me was coming up for a reason why I was in my chair. I LOVE 
to be in my chair, it is so much a part of me and all this stress about 
pretending and all that never happens to me when I am in my chair. It is a 
safe place and basically its relief from the obsession of BUD, I am living 
my life like I always thought I was meant to be living it" 
Sometimes the injury is inflicted gradually over time, whether loosing 
muscle capacity by sitting in a wheel chair too frequently, or in the case of Martin 
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where the result of the injury is considered not only a correction-but the 
correction: 
"/ always had the feeling my knee is there and I have always been very 
aware of my leg and my knee. To a certain degree I would agree that now 
my knee "disappears" a little but... not totally... but a bit. And this is 
actually happening when a knee joint is fused, the joint is gone. And when 
you could see my legs, you would see the shape of my right knee has 
changed, the contour is still visible clearly, but it looks different from the 
left knee. The left knee looks much stronger and has a "normal", strong 
contour. In a certain way you can say that fusing my knee is a bit like 
losing it, it will be gone and is not there, its function is gone, the contour 
looks different. But, I still have a high awareness of my leg as a whole and 
it has always been my leg as a whole that is somehow special to me. So 
you could say, technically it is a knee fusion that I wanted and the 
resulting straight and stiff leg is the outcome it creates. And that is the true 
image I have about myself." 
All modifying informants consider physical debilitation and self-injury to be 
an empowering 'body correction' to some extent. This demonstrates just how 
non-normative their perception of embodiment is: to 'correct' the body through 
drastically reducing its functioning. It may seem absurd, but the common 
experience of the transabled is that there is no mental correction available to 
them. Self-injury to this extent is a phenomena that angers many, and because of 
this I often find myself defending my informants and the populations they 
represent. One claim amongst others (e.g. attention seeking / perverted) that is 
often laid against them is that they are lazy. I feel that this one in particular is a 
weak, but interesting claim. Lazy people can find ways not to work or even walk, 
but if you have witnessed an amputee or paraplegic in action you see how 
straining basic daily rituals can become. 
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Automutilation is what we call it when animals self-mutilate. We call it this 
because we are weary about whether animals possess a sense of self (Favazza, 
68). I am moved to wonder whether 'otherwise normal' humans are not 
sometimes just as unconscious; if one's sense of self is of someone far from 
whom one is, what is a sense of self? Are automatons always submissive to the 
social order, or has the social order spawned a new sort, those who know their 
true selves to be something different from what they are, and will undergo drastic 
means to finally become who they felt they always really were. There is 
something haunting and common amongst all of these forms of, or forms of 
desire for, self-injury, and self injury is a part of any moniker I have put to use in 
this thesis (BUD, apotemnophilia, transability...). 
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IV 
Embodiment Troubles, Pretending: 
Pretending in the context of BUD is when physically able people pretend to 
be physically disabled. This may take various forms; a person desiring to be an 
amputee may bind up an arm or a leg and wear loose fitting clothes to 
camouflage it. A person desiring paralysis of the legs may spend much of their 
public (and private) time in a wheelchair. Pretending is a theme which arose 
frequently in my discussions with informants- all of my BUD participants have 
pretended at one time or another, usually in secret as youth and still secretly, but 
in public as well as private locations, as adults. Sean offers us what is likely one 
of the most intense cases of pretending ever: he has been living his public life as 
a paraplegic for the past 12 years. There is often a stark contrast of pleasure and 
discomfort when pretending. While informants purport to feeling most 
comfortable when they are in their chair, there is also that "uneasy sense of 
standing under a sign to which one does and does not belong" (Butler 219 BTM). 
I walk across the Tim Horton's parking lot to meet a woman who is sitting 
outside in a wheelchair, waving enthusiastically at me. As I get closer I see an 
excited grin spread across her face. She has told me she will be middle aged and 
overweight, but she is only slightly top heavy, the remnants of three young 
children, and she does not look much more than my 25 years. She appears neat 
and tidy, is dressed stylishly and is wheeling a slight, titanium chair that cost her 
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$3,500 out of pocket: state-of-the-art, purchased online. She giggles and 
introduces herself, "Have you figured out where I'm from yet, I've given you 
enough hints?" I haven't and we laugh at this, but it is not awkward and there is 
no tension although I have been nervous about participating in this game of 
pretending and am about to get a taste of it first-hand. 
I have been e-mailing back and forth with Claire for months and though I 
surely have enough material to go on, the opportunity to spend some time with 
her in person in her chair is too tempting to miss. We decide to go someplace 
more private to chat, the condominium style hotel where she is staying. She is 
seriously uncomfortable with the possibility of anyone knowing she is pretending, 
but is even more troubled by the guilt that accompanies lying, even to perfect 
strangers. This has created a strange dichotomy for her to the point where she 
went as far as to self-inflict an "actual" disability which no longer offers her 
pleasure or much relief, except from the burden of completely lying. For today, 
she is faced with a smaller, still difficult predicament of negotiating the two-fold 
guilt of pretending: On one hand, Claire feels badly for pretending because she 
does not legitimately require a wheelchair and there are people who do and she 
knows that they are, for the most part, disgusted with and upset by people like 
her. On the other hand, she feels badly for pretending because of the demands 
she must make on other non-disabled people and because of the trickery 
involved. Claire tells me of a current predicament that illustrates this conundrum: 
"There was a problem checking into my hotel. I requested an accessible 
room and when I got here I saw that it was not accessible at all. There 
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was a step to get into the main part. That is always really hard. I had to 
make the decision, well, it doesn't really matter to me whether it is 
accessible or not, I could get out of my chair and walk in, well, you see, it 
pisses me off, because they said the room was accessible and it's not. So, 
for a really disabled person it would be impossible to use that room. So I 
had to decide-Do I say anything? Do I strand up in this case, for disabled 
people, or do I shut up because I feel bad about them going to all this 
bother for me? I called them and they came down, and immediately came 
down and built a little ramp. Now there is no way I cannot use my chair 
here, you see; if they saw me walking!" 
Claire expertly wheels herself across the busy street into the hotel parking 
lot and over the ramp to her ground floor room and is faced with another concern 
that would be a genuine problem for someone with compromised mobility; her 
room keys won't work. Suddenly she springs into action to get into her vehicle, 
the whole routine takes less than a minute: Claire hops from her chair into the 
driver seat, pushes back the passenger seat, pops the wheels off the chair and 
tosses them behind her head into the back of the van. Then she grabs the chair 
and, holding onto it with both arms, leans backwards placing it behind her, she 
readjusts the seats and is off. It looks exhausting to me and there is still the 
dismount to consider, but she seems to enjoy the whole process, a wide grin 
firmly planted on her face. We drive off to the main building to retrieve new keys. 
I am hyper aware of people's reactions to us as we enter the lobby; they watch 
Claire with restrained curiosity as she busily maneuvers her chair. They seem 
slightly horrified as they listen to her predicament and return her a new set of 
keys. Again she is popping the wheels off her chair and tossing the whole bit into 
the back of her van. We arrive back at her room in a few minutes and there is a 
problem with the new key cards, they don't work either. This time Claire calls the 
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administration and in a few quick moments the proprietor is there, flustered and 
apologetic. I find myself looking at him disapprovingly and suddenly feel like a 
pawn in the game, a bit of the guilt Claire speaks of creeps in and I smile at him 
and shrug my shoulders as he rushes off to fetch yet another set of keys. 
7 don't know why they said they had a room that was accessible, it is still 
not really accessible", Claire tells me as we settle into the kitchenette to begin 
our main discussion, "the bathroom is totally inaccessible and if I was really 
disabled I would never be able to turn the air conditioning on." She demonstrates 
by hopping up from her chair and turning on the air. Seeing her walk across the 
room produces the first flash of anxiety I have experienced since meeting Claire; 
it is almost as though I came to expect her to be really disabled. Suddenly I am 
seeing in front of my very eyes the schizophrenic reality of the problem. I notice 
that the bed is also quite high and that a truly physically disabled person of 
Claire's stature would likely have some difficulty getting to bed tonight. 
Claire is not yet using her chair full-time and has only been using it for 2 
years. She takes every opportunity she is away from home to wheel and has 
several excuses to feed skeptics and those who know her who question why she 
owns a chair and why she sometimes uses it. For Sean, who now lives "full time" 
in a wheelchair, wheeling was a much earlier part of his experience with BUD: 
"In my mid teens, I rented my first wheelchair. An old clunker, which at the 
time was pretty much the only thing available. I remember having trouble 
finding money to pay the deposit, but somehow I managed. I also hid that 
in the basement of our apartment, and escaped every time I could to use 
it. It wasn't difficult, my mother worked evenings a lot. I don't recall very 
51 
well what I felt when I first sat in that wheelchair...! do remember a lot of 
anxiety and fear of being discovered. I had to hide in the basement, I 
didn't have much space to move about, I didn't really have anything to do. 
Yet, it was an important part of my growing up with BUD." 
A photograph of Claire in her wheelchair 
Claire has found the cliche of delayed gratification to be realized. This 
excerpt is comprised of sections from her blog dated November 10, 2006. In it, 
she presents in vivid details her account of the first time she purchased and used 
a wheelchair of her own: 
"I was afraid, unsure...Because if I didn't have BUD, then this was 
pointless, and whatever was wrong with me, the chair wasn't going to 
help, and I had gone through a lot of anguish and expense over it for 
nothing. And if I did have BUD, then this was like saying "I do" and till 
death to us part, I'd never be free of it. ..I stared at the chair.. .1 took a deep 
breath. Stood up. Pushed my office chair out of the way. Rolled my 
wheelchair over to me, positioned it in front of the computer. Took another 
deep breath. And sat down...my universe had indeed shifted. It was off by 
a few degrees and it made a slight shift and suddenly it was right. I was 
filled with this unbelievable joy. A feeling of completeness, ofrightness, of 
relief. I felt, rather than heard, a door slamming behind me, the lock 
turning, no going back now". 
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Claire's new-found comfort via her wheel chair echoes the assertion of a 
wholeness or completion (in terms of identity) that so many BUD sufferers 
express when they realize their imagined embodied form. As Martin told me,"/ 
am now living my dream". 
A sensitive issue in all of this which Claire has alluded to and which 
cannot be ignored is the act of pretending in contrast to the reality of disability. 
The act of pretending seems utterly bizarre, if not offensive, particularly to 
someone whose limbs are subject to accidental or necessary amputation or 
paralysis. As one would suspect, it is difficult for those who live through the 
burden of real physical disability to empathize with those who suffer an ailment 
that is so unbelievably odd: those who do not only not appreciate their physical 
well-being but loath it and consider it a disadvantage to their overall well-being. 
This is a popular topic of discussion amongst the participants on online forums, 
many whom have spent much time convincing real disabled people of their kin 
disability (the mental one) that requires that they desire a physical manifestation 
often resulting in pretending. As Claire reveals, "Based on my experiences 
talking to people who have a physical disability about BUD, that whole community 
is very much against pretenders and devotees and stuff like thaf. 
There are many transgendered people in disagreement over the proposed 
similarities between their desire for a gender other than the one they physically 
represent and BUD persons' desire for a physique that represents their "genuine" 
53 
identity. Many disabled people are more than "against" pretenders: they are 
outright outraged at the prospect of people with BUD merely existing. One of the 
reasons for this seems to be the apparently perverse nature of pretending, the 
notion that people do so because they are sexually aroused by it. Another widely 
shared belief is that people who desire to have sexual relations with disabled 
people want to dominate them and take advantage of them because they are 
weak or "crippled". Clearly, this is not a popular group to draw alliances with. 
While I am entirely sympathetic to the arguments put forth by physically 
disabled people, I am not surprised that after lengthy discussion with pretenders 
some transform their outrage and disbelief. Sean is one example of someone 
with BUD who has shared a significant relationship with a physically disabled 
person who was at first shocked, then came into a sympathetic understanding of 
his condition. Claire has a friend who is physically impaired and in a wheel chair 
who is "fairly open minded" but who still "has discussions" with Claire about this. 
Their heightened sense of forgiveness is not as unlikely as it may seem. It is not 
that people who suffer from BUD take for granted their mobility and physical 
health, but they are far more concerned about the impact not realizing their ideal 
embodiment has on their overall health and productivity. They consider 
themselves mentally disabled and incapable of living true, content lives, and do 
not see the remedy as a cruel catch so much as they consider their lack of 
treatment options the cruel reality of the situation. This was one of the more 
surprising realizations I had about people with BUD: I expected quite a lot of 
disdain for the affliction, yet there was very little self-pity in terms of Why do I 
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have to have BUD? However, there was quite a bit of frustration expressed in 
terms of Why can't I get the help I need for my BUD? 
V 
Embodiment Troubles, Self: 
Identity vs. Sexuality: 
Questions of selfhood and identity are usually bound to questions of 
sexuality. The choices we make are not immune to any aspect of our identity, we 
are our sexuality, though we may not acknowledge this or realize it on a 
conscious level. The consideration of the sexual nature of BUD (in this sense 
usually considered apotemnophilia) is one consistently revealed in internet 
forums, but not one often probed by the interviewers in the literature and media 
available. When we use the language of identity, selfhood, and desire, we are 
inevitably speaking of our sexuality; as a part of our real or ideal self, as a driver 
of our desires. If we do not probe the specificity of this discourse in the further 
consideration of embodiment troubles we will come no closer to an 
understanding of the complex and compulsive drive for these radical 
transformations of physical being. The identities of those with the embodiment 
troubles discussed here, much like those seeking gender transformations, are 
often complex and seemingly individual. Just as a transsexual man may identify 
himself as a woman trapped in a man's body, he may still desire a woman for his 
sexual partner post-surgery. He may consider himself a lesbian trapped in a 
man's body, or some other gender identity mash-up. Similarly, distinctions 
between amputees, wannabes, pretenders and devotees are often unclear and 
simultaneously very specific. 
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The quest to belong to a group is to identify with particular meanings 
through symbolic processes. Normative heterosexuality stands in as the base 
group to which the majority of embodied subjects purport to belong, through a 
persistent, unconscious "performing" of the historic socio-political construction of 
the modern subject. Evidently, within sexuality there is a spectrum of sexualities 
that seems (with the mind-blowing continuum of pornography available in cyber 
space) infinite. If identity is contingent on the base difference of sex, does this 
mean that other differences are born of that essential difference? If so, what are 
the intricacies of this process of signification: are these created differences 
caused by the base construction of sex, must they always refer to it, and are they 
derived from it? (Butler 167 BTM). 
Differences in embodiment are primers for identity, and through these 
physical differences we have come to accept a whole economy of differences 
that are contingent upon various illusive constructs. I do believe that biological 
differences are important in the simple fact that we are embodied subjects, and 
our embodiment is an incredibly valid component of our subjectivity, regardless 
of what constructs we believe our bodies' aid in prescribing. The insistence that 
there is an essential difference between problems of identity and problems of 
sexuality is one that dissolves almost immediately upon closer examination. 
In Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler discusses sex and identity as a 
singular construct contingent on the paternal law. She uses Slavoj Zizek's idea 
that the (postmodern) "phantasmatic promise of identity as a rallying point within 
political discourse as well as the inevitability of disappointment' (Butler 188 
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BTM), makes identity claims "impossible" (Butler ibid). Through her discussion of 
Zizek's definition of identity a point of interrogation common to my interviews 
emerges: regret and disappointment are qualitative of the postmodern concept of 
identity. This is an idea simultaneously shared and refuted by my informants who 
view their actual embodiment as a severe disappointment and in the same breath 
are satisfied beyond belief with their transformation of embodiment after they 
attain their desired form. They refuse the possibility of being disappointed in an 
identity that they have always maintained as Real, through its constant 
contestation with reality. 
I am certain that there is a sexual element to BUD. It is a problem far more 
complex than a sexual preference or perversion, still, I do believe that it is quite 
possible that it is sexual in essence and becomes inflated as it intensifies and 
morphs into the primary aspect of the identity of the "transabled" person. There is 
much attention paid to the fact that the sufferer of BUD is otherwise "normal. The 
fact that informants very strongly consider their identity as primarily that of a BUD 
sufferer or their body image as primarily that of a disabled person, is highly 
problematic and it is an assertion or belief that engulfs their whole life. During a 
conversation with Claire I told her that when I consider identity as it pertains to 
my embodiment, I primarily conceptualize myself as being a woman- my female 
body. I ask what her primary conceptualization of her own body is. She answers, 
7 would say that its more about being disabled than being female...1 never 
thought about that like that, but that's what it is." Claire who is only very mildly 
physically disabled (many would not consider her self induced affliction genuinely 
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debilitating), who has birthed three children, who has lived as a subject in her 
individual embodiment (give or take some minor modifications) for almost 40 
years, is so compelled by the desire to be disabled that it has usurped her body 
image. This example illustrates how deeply afflicting this problem can be. 
I am not surprised when my informants assert that BUD plays no 
significant part of their sexuality, I have almost come to expect them to. I 
understand that they perceive particular possibilities as being extinguished if BUD 
is slotted into a fetish category as opposed to a legitimate and distinct mental 
illness. What does come as a bit of a surprise is how transparent this assertion 
seems when engaging in dialogue about their psycho-sexual development and in 
reading over interview scripts. This is not a problem of intentional manipulation, 
rather, informants are genuinely confused about the nature of their problem, as is 
most anyone who closely examines BUD. While many initially present a seeming 
deeply entrenched idea about why they have BUD (e.g. Claire: neurological 
problem), conversations reveal the complexity and pervading sexual element to 
their obsession. The following passage comes from Claire, talking about her 
course to BUD: 
"/ thought it was... I had a special appreciation for people who were 
disabled and... I never really subjected my desire to be disabled to a 
whole lot of questioning, I never really understood it but when I was 
younger it never really tormented me a lot either. It got worse as I got 
older...didn't ignore it; I just did a lot of fantasizing. I never told 
anybody...even now ifs kind of hard to explain for me. I really don't know 
why I never told anybody, but I knew it was unusual, and even now after 
I've done a lot of reflecting and it wasn't until, well, with the advent of the 
internet I started doing research...I found this chat room for people with 
disabilities...! was like a regular...that was the first I had ever heard about 
wannabes or devotees... I didn't even, I always knew I was really attracted 
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to people with disabilities and I had no idea that there was more than one 
human being on the face of the earth who felt like that, and in this 
chatroom, like in one breath they told me that it existed and then how 
creepy and evil and disgusting it was. I repressed that for a long time, and 
the wannabe thing... I was really ashamed- Oh my god, I didn't realize I 
was so awful and so disgusting! I felt a lot of shame and I sort of 
repressed it and I thought, that's not me, I'm just really interested and I 
really care a lot about those people... I never met anyone, I would have 
though. There was a guy at school who I was really attracted to who is in a 
chair but nothing ever happened.. .but I would have though. I would have 
had no problem with that." 
Martin also presents a response to my inquiry that is explicit about a 
separation between sexuality and identity. I found some irony in this when 
looking at this photograph that Martin sent me of his fused knee. It reminds me of 
a pin-up type photograph (perhaps it's the bulge or the shoe?) and gives me a 
sense of the aesthetic of his leg as being one that is sexualized (Granted, this 
may be my perception and not his intent or underlying desire). 
Image of Martin's fused leg (2008) 
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I ask Martin how his sexuality relates to his knee fusion and whether he 
is aroused by this or other disabilities. He answers: 
"This question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. BUD is part of 
my sexuality. But, my blood pressure between my legs does not go up 
when I see a disabled person, it is more an emotional arousal rather than 
sexual. Nevertheless, it is part of my sexuality. I cannot have a sexual 
relationship without my leg, it is part of it. I firmly believe, real BUD relates 
to Gender Identity Disorder. Being trapped in the wrong body does not 
only apply to the gender as in GID, it can also affect limbs and then we 
talk about BUD, but many underlying things are the same. You may talk to 
transsexual people and you will suddenly find common things you may 
have never expected... This why BUD is not a paraphilia, it is much more, 
it is much more complex as you can see." 
Claire agrees that every person with BUD is not necessarily a devotee or 
vice versa, she abides by a BUD spectrum, much akin to the gender spectrum I 
mentioned, whereby there is room for a plethora of transecting identities. She 
does not believe, however, that people have much control over where they fall on 
the spectrum. I agree that this may become the situation as an unfulfilled desire 
can grow to inflated proportions and become a compulsive obsession. Informants 
do not accept this trajectory as the reason BUD feels like an identity problem that 
is much more significant than a sexual problem, but within every interview there 
was a clear link between the desire for disability and a sexual attraction to 
disability. This relationship was almost always initially obscured by the informant. 
Again, I posit that this is reflective of the information informants have accessed, 
the language they have learned to use to describe their desire, so that it may 
gain validity by sounding as real as it feels to them. Tobias provided me with a 
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standard example of this strategy: "What I want, need, is my left leg off above the 
knee. I know more or less exactly where on the thigh it should end. That desire in 
itself I don't feel is sexually motivated'. When I asked Tobias some questions 
about his sexual development he said that he began masturbating at the same 
time as most boys do,"in combination with pretending". 
We are sexual people in one way or another. We may assert the power of 
other devices over our libidinal drives, but they will always be revealed in some 
capacity. I could debate an eternity over the differentiation between sex and 
identity, and the following passage serves well to illustrate the probable tautology 
of that debate. Claire expresses a sexual attraction to disabled people and 
simultaneously asserts that her interest is fundamentally not sexual. Over time, 
the questions ware into more confident confessions and she becomes candid 
about the sexual aspect of her desire: 
".../ am on a forum for female devotes...! actually think it's a paraphilia-
being a devotee. Earlier we had talked about- does it have to be a 
paraphilia to be attracted to someone with a disability-and I think it's a 
paraphilia because you can't control it. You see someone in a wheelchair 
like a parapelegic, like a hot Paralympic type guy and you're heart starts 
beating and you're like (panting)...! think it's connected because there are 
so many people with BUD who are devotees" 
"...A sexual element (lowers her voice to a whisper) after I had started 
using my chair for a while and I started going to school regularly, like twice 
a week -I started to get sexually aroused as I was on my way, driving... 
almost an anticipation of being in my chair. And once I was in my chair it 
went away. And it didn't happen until I had had my chair for a long time. It 
wasn't my reason for starting wheeling....! didn't want it this way, I always 
said that it's not sexual and I certainly didn't want it that way...I'd get to 
school and have to get out my chair and get to class and I just wouldn't 
think about it, it would leave my mind." 
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Claire's articulation brims with sexual excitement related to being disabled 
and to other's disability. She envisions her immobility from the waist down: legs, 
not including genitals. If this example seems extreme, it serves as a considerably 
more severe embodiment of psychological trouble when a fundamentally sexual 
desire can manifest in the proclaimed need for a form of such intense libidinal 
regression as the desire for paraplegia: wanting to surrender sexuality, or to be 
sexual in a permanently submissive manner, lifeless from the waist down, as with 
Sean. This may be the result of an utter disruption of psycho-sexual development 
resulting in obsessive and destructive embodiment anxieties so fundamentally 
entrenched in the being that he will become an obsolete body to achieve this 
most tragic notion of comfort. He will voluntarily become incontinent and impotent 
under the premise that he has no other choice but death. 
I question an anonymous informant, who performs castration (among 
many other) procedures on body modification clients: Who desires to make their 
sexuality obsolete, and how are you able to perform these life-turning procedures 
that null and void their genital libido ? 
"Most of the time its people who take part in heavy bdsm (bondage, 
domination, submission, sadism, masochism), most of them are 
submissives and most of the time it is because they do not want to derive 
pleasure sexually...Well, it's because the-, people who are into heavy 
bondage play and whatnot- they derive their sexual pleasure differently; 
they do not derive it directly from their genitals. And for a lot of them 
chastity and forced chastity are also a big part of the fetish. So, to 
heighten yourself sexually- it sounds weird- but you have to nullify your 
libido in that way so you can get off in different ways...For some people 
different parts of their bodies are really where they get their sexual 
pleasure and sexual stimulation, it's not from their genitals,-they find their 
genitals distract from that pleasure." 
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If there is a larger social peril at work here it may be that we have long ago 
reached Barthes's conclusion that sex is "everywhere except in sexuality" (1983), 
and come to, as Baudrillard acknowledged, a period in which there is no longer 
sexual liberation- where desires are transferred onto objects and these objects 
become the site and actor of desire. The objects in question may be the 
objectified limb set to rid (in the case of Tobias) or in the disabled embodiment 
one longs for (Claire). These interpretations of object demonstrate the possibility 
for their being grounded in selfhood-as sites of subjectivity, a possibility that may 
inevitably leave us all abject. If we transfer our desires onto objects or completely 
objectify our relations of desire we may find that we are no longer involved in 
reciprocal sexual relations, but in purely phantasmagorical inflations of forbidden 
desires. These desires mutate our relational capacities and usurp our control, 
becoming fetishes or other problematic sexual desires. For example, the wide 
spread use of Real Dolls™ (life-size, anatomically correct, silicon "love dolls") for 
sex demonstrate the power of pure objects to seduce the apparent subject 
(Ashton, 2007). 
The apparent reality effect (the omnipotence of hyperreality, which allows 
simulation to appear more real than real, confusing what is real to the point 
where it is now impossible to discern) that empowers these objects to usurp the 
sexuality of their embodied subjects represents a fading of sex's reality effect. I 
am reminded of Baudrillard's rhetorical conversation in Forget Foucault on sex 
and pornography in which he writes, "Sex itself becomes involuted and 
disappears as a strong referent in the hyperreality of "liberated" sexuality" (ibid, 
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14). With the reciprocal, biological relation removed from sex, the chosen 
paraplegic (dis)embodiment represents liberation (as with prophylaxis in sex) of 
that supreme sort of safety reality (no biological risks in sex) that can only be 
described as an illusion, one that will likely not dissipate the libidinal regression. 
Speaking the Embodiment Divide: 
The health of our population is subject to the disturbing collaboration 
between pharmaceutical and insurance companies, governments, researchers, 
physicians, and consumers. This system incorporates diagnostic categorization 
criteria- part of a medical language accessible through communication with 
clinicians and the internet, and reimbursement agendas- into its discourse. 
Theodore Dalrymple, a writer, psychiatrist and former prison and inner city 
physician discusses the "proletariatization of doctors" (2007) at the hands of the 
government. The effects of this phenomenon result in doctors experiencing a 
great loss of autonomy in recent years and this has resulted in a loss of control 
over protocol, questioning of patients, time management and the selection of new 
doctors. This turns physicians into "clock watchers" who treat patients like 
"parcels on an assembly line". The change in profession combined with the 
promotion of easily accessible consumption of anything and everything 
qualitative of a neoliberal agenda paired with the constant human drive towards 
perfection allows us to access medication at an unprecedented level. This may 
seem to contrast the self-reflective nature of the language of selfhood, a point 
recognized by Dalrymple (2006): "It is curious how an age of public self-
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revelation, and of the use of psychological jargon, should also be an age when 
self-examination is rarely practiced'. 
The effects of the conglomeration of these systems are all around us. I 
first became aware of the effects of this on a corporate level while work for a high 
end catering company. A large portion of our business was putting on elaborate 
dinners for groups of doctors from different practices who would hold the dinners 
in their homes, co-hosted by various energetic, handsome, well-dressed and 
charming pharmaceutical representatives. They would dine on lobster, steak, fine 
cheeses and wines, prepared by a set of chefs in their whites, and served by 
myself and other immaculately mannered servers. Somewhere between the hor 
d'oeuvres and appetizers there would be a fairly short presentation followed by a 
brief question period. Before I discovered the purpose of such dinner parties I 
went about my business helping in the kitchen, filling wine glasses, tossing 
shrimp tails. Once I realized who was footing the bill on these evenings, I opened 
my ears and quietly listened. I knew something was being sold, but I was naive 
about the flair with which drug companies pimp their wares to prescription pad 
carriers. The presentations were laced with triumphant testimonials and trial 
success stories. Samples were distributed, more glasses were emptied, and all in 
all this portion of the evening was kept brief. Of the drugs I took note of; there 
was an asthma puffer, an acute back pain killer, and a couple of 
psychopharmaceuticals. The bills for these evenings were of the intimate 
wedding variety. Corporations make big money- these dinners had to be paying 
for themselves and more. This was the first time I realized the extent of the 
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lucrative relationship between physicians and pharmaceutical companies, and 
became interested in our own keen collaboration with our physicians to access 
the treatments we desire. As Claire expressed, 'We want treatment, we want it to 
have a name, we want it to be studied. I want it to be in the DSM." 
The desire for the symbol of legitimacy that participants recognize as 
BIIDs inclusion in the DSM, also stems from the human desire to name as an 
identity-affirming act. Judith Butler discusses the role of naming on our identity 
constructs: 
As a consequence, the name mobilizes an identity at the same time that it 
confirms its fundamental alterability. The name orders and institutes a 
variety of free-floating signifiers into an "identity"; the name effectively 
"sutures" the object. (208 BTM) 
This "suturing" of the disabled identity is the aim for my informants. They 
very much want to be contained by that identity label, its radical otherness and all 
the effects it endures. 
In his inventory of our preoccupation and gluttonous consumption of 
enhancement technologies in Better Than Well, American Medicine Meets the 
American Dream, Carl Elliott explores specific cultural conditions which may be 
responsible for producing certain medical conditions. Elliott considers the 
language we use in speaking our identities, such as naming, key to coming to an 
understanding of why we so hungrily consume psycho pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetic surgeries and intense physical regiments. What is most interesting 
about the way we describe our modifications is the linguistic reflecting the 
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psychological division of ourselves into a sort of 'before' and 'after' persona in 
which the latter, the one enhanced artificially, is the more true self. Elliott reveals 
of his interviews with enhancers (body builder, Prozac user, self-amputee), "In 
each case the true self was the one produced by medical science" (211). 
When we speak about our desires, we are speaking about something that 
comes before language. After entering linguistic communication we are always 
bound to the expression of these desires and when those which we attempt to 
express are unspeakable, the use of metaphor is a necessity of language. This 
pertains to the Cartesian divide remaining so strong semantically. In the following 
passage Martin explains his youth hood involvement in physical activity as a 
metaphor for his crisis of embodiment. While metaphor may be the only way in 
which we might begin to express our subjective realities, an understanding of 
metaphor as a tool is often forsaken. It seems that the usefulness of metaphor 
provides fodder for the presentation of a highly disconnected thinking/being, the 
embodied subject who sounds disembodied. 
"/ did not belong to any special group... Actually I did a lot of sports when I 
was young. Especially the time when I was 14 and 15. Back then I was 
doing so much sports. Today it is my opinion that at that time I was literally 
running away from my true self. I was running a lot when I was 14, but one 
day I stopped doing sports from one second to the other. I could not get 
rid of the real image I had about myself. I could no longer run away from 
myself. But, of course at that age I had no clue how I could ever struggle 
to get what I need so much, f just knew I cannot run away from it and 
finally stopped to run away. So, doing a lot of sports was not only fun, I 
think it really was a metaphor". 
As I have stressed, the usefulness of the distinction between BUD as a 
sexual problem or an identity problem and the viability of this distinction is, in a 
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way, the plight of this issue. I believe this is why the language of selfhood is so 
ingrained in metaphor when describing embodiment troubles. The language of 
selfhood articulates the mind and body as two distinctly separate entities capable 
of abiding by entirely different schemas (e.g. I just don't feel like myself, Even 
though I am overweight I have always been a thin person inside). This 
metaphorical consideration maybe one that is not only deeply entrenched in our 
language, but one that has the propensity to work somatically, as the possibility 
for the mind and body to work in opposition schematically. This possibility finds a 
compelling case in the incident of phantom pains. 
When researchers began to explore the phenomena of body image, they 
looked to phantom pains as a particular instance in which the body image (the 
part of the brain they determined is responsible for the way we see, or 
conceptualize our bodies), and corporeality are incongruent (Ramachandran, 
1998). In the BBC documentary "Brain Story" (2000) we are introduced to 
patients experiencing phantom limbs long after their medically necessary 
amputations. The patients may try to stand up from bed after a leg amputation, or 
scratch with a finger or hand that is no longer there. While scientists are still 
somewhat baffled by this phenomenon, they can locate the region of the brain 
responsible for body image (within the right parietal lobe) and observe that it is 
not necessarily affected even by radical embodiment changes. The amputees 
once had the limb in question, and their brains have learned its embodiment and 
are trained to know the intricacies (nerves, muscles...) of the limbs. People who 
feel that their limb is foreign or incompatible with their body image do not have 
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the same experience of a sudden wrenching disconnect between the brain's 
body image and their embodiment in its changed form that those who experience 
necessary amputation do. The part of the brain responsible for body image in 
BUD people has always represented the limb in its natural usefulness. While 
neither (voluntary or necessary amputees) are brain damaged, they both suffer 
embodiment troubles which are tangible to them alone. 
Adam describes the desire to experience a new sensation in the form of a 
phantom finger as his primary reason (beyond aesthetics) for removing his digit. 
Claire tells of an occasion on which she asks whether other members of 
"translabled.org" consider their situation a reversal of phantom pains and she 
received mostly negative responses. Still, all present a philosophy of like 
discordance between the mind and body schemas as being a legitimate claim for 
their "transability". Perhaps they do not interrogate the philosophical argument 
against their predicament because they are living it. 
Access to articulations of experiences such as the subjects of Brain Story, 
on transabled.org and others, and the abundance of both diagnostic criteria and 
the language of self and subjectivity do not mean that embodiment troubles are 
the direct manifestations of the saturation of digital connectivity and the resulting 
availability of the language used to diagnose and divide, but that they are at the 
very least reflective of these communication mechanisms. The internet gives us a 
template to learn to belong to particular medical groups. Dr. Schwarz offers an 
example of this when considering the role of the internet on the medicalized 
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language of patients as their way of speaking relates to the success of their 
access to surgery: "It becomes a play with words". 
VI 
Approaching Theory: 
In rethinking the persistent peril in sociology of forgetting the body as a 
social/biological/environmental entity, this sociology of the body is the sociology 
of self and subjectivity. I look at these bodies as they are: the subjects' total 
embodied experience. I also consider the metaphorical ways we speak about our 
bodies, and consider these experiences as telling of a wider condition in which 
we now live. The body is a consistently employed metaphor for almost 
everything, but out of the usefulness of the body as metaphor we seem to have 
come to forget ourselves as wholly embodied subjects. In our thought and 
analysis on the sociology of the body we too often perform the Cartesian 
dissection of mind and body (Ozawa, 2002), which has facilitated this sort of 
physical embodiment of schizophrenic divides, manifesting in radical negotiations 
of embodied space, marking contemporary multiplication of the 'grotesque body'-
be it through obesity, self-amputation or any other 'obscene' reconfiguration. 
There is an abundance of very compelling contemporary theory which 
does not address these phenomena in particular, but which possesses 
possibilities for explaining severe embodiment troubles. As my project began with 
an interest in exploring particular theories through the example of radical 
modifications of embodiment, I will discuss these main philosophies here. 
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Kristeva: 
Beginning with the subject/object relation in the work of Julia Kristeva, the 
subject is devoted to the traditional triad of oedipal confusion as presented 
through psychoanalysis. Kristeva breaks from Freudian thought in her urgent re-
positioning of the m/other through her advancement of feminine consideration 
into the foreground by emphasizing the role of the m/other. Kristeva finds that it is 
insufficient to consider the mother the object (of desire), because she is bound 
intrinsically, and partially (by her biological reproduction, to start), to her role as 
subject. Specifically pertinent to this analysis is the case of the 'ab-ject' as 
discussed in Powers of Horror, an Essay on Abjection (1982): that not quite 
subject, not quite object, who has failed at sufficient separation from the m/other 
and orientation into their independent subjecthood. In order to become an 
adjusted subject one must come to look upon the mother as the abject, not with 
disdain or contempt, but as one which we came from and were physically one 
with, and concurrently separate from and autonomous of. Confusion over this 
hazy position is the plight of the abject. 
Abjection also extends to any life course corporeal tensions: Kristeva 
employs the example of "dung" as the become-abject which drops from the 
subject (ibid, 3). Likewise, the self-amputee 'drops' that which is neither s/he (as 
s/he conceives her ideal self) nor apart from he/r: the loathed appendage. The 
abject becomes such through the incompletion of this symbolic process 
(successful subject's division from mother and father) and comes into a profound 
fascination with a particular horror: in his case, one's own body as a functional 
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whole. The self-amputee abjects himself, and moreover, is the very abject in 
question: Observe the horror with which we encounter the drastically modified. 
Whether the embodied subjects remain plagued with neurosis, or become 
psychotic ,lies in confusion of the paternal law in the adoption of a physical 
transformation representative of an embodiment of the castration anxiety 
expressed through the castration of the abject appendage which the anxiety has 
been transferred to, or a full (or almost complete) libidinal regression that calls for 
the symbolic nullification of any form of genital sexual engagement: a complete 
liberation of the psycho-sexual repression that plagued whatever problematic 
stage of the informant's development- their unspoken, reenacted trauma. 
The abject plays out a dramatic alteration of embodied borders, 
emblematic of their confinement to the margins of society, just as Kristeva 
articulates her own experience of abjection in its most common form of food 
loathing when she encounters the repulsive "cigarette paper thin" skin on a drink 
of milk, "my body extricates itself... from that border* {ibid, 2). Newly embodied 
borders exemplify radical interpretations of the abject as "something rejected 
from which one does not part' (ibid, 4), radical in this particular case in that the 
abject does physically part from its abject limb in the sense of a disembodiment 
(amputation), while simultaneously remaining the abject par excellence. 
When coming from a standpoint partially structured by psychoanalytic 
theory the researcher approaches interview subjects from the position of analyst. 
She pretends at speaking, or at least locating, the unspeakable. This is 
unavoidable, as we do not only read theory once the research is over. 
74 
Throughout the research process, to test our theories accordingly, we must 
create an atmosphere for discussion that entices the participant to delve deeply 
into their psyche (in this sense when I do interviews I play at being the analyst). 
As I interpret answers and flow the interview accordingly, I am doing the 
detective work of the analyst, prompting my subject to search their unconscious 
for the roots of their desires, to speak their abjection. A gift of psychoanalysis is 
that the intimate nature of discussions surrounding embodiment allows for 
patients to reveal their unconscious fears and desires without much prompting. 
At the beginning of my first interview with Adam, who performs various body-
modifications as a profession, is heavily modified himself, and is on the cusp of a 
(self)digit amputation, I ask him to frame the trajectory of his relationship with 
body modification, to locate his primary experience. He describes how at eleven 
he began cutting or piercing himself and keeping a meticulous log of these 
experiences written behind his bedpost: 
"...Really, it's like, it's weird. I'd have the sensation part in my head where 
I knew I needed to do something or like pierce something that day or like 
do a cut on myself. For some reason I would always write it on the wall 
behind my headboard and years later when I saw it, it was all like, it was 
the anniversary of my brother's death at that time and the next time was 
another significant date and I never really consciously thought about it, but 
I would mark myself on these dates and later on when I was looking at the 
dates I was like; Oh my god! Oh my god! I never realized it was serious. I 
never really thought consciously like I want to get a piercing. It just 
happened when I was young, it was an instinctive thing. It was like 7 or 8 
years later when I went to visit my parents and I was like; Oh wow it's still 
there, and I looked at all those dates and I realized. I think it's instinctive to 
mark your flesh, and at such a young age too, I never really knew. Now I 
realize when I feel a sensation I can look at my life and see what's going 
on and see where the desire stems...when I looked at that wall I realized 
this is the way I have always been." 
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Adam mentions at the beginning of our conversation that he had begun 
modifying at around 10 years, but did not elaborate until after a revealing couple 
of hours of conversation in which he spoke candidly and assuredly. At this point I 
asked him to return in memory to that early transitory period and consider it in 
relation to his changing (pubescent) body and anything else that might have 
been affecting him at that time. I was fascinated by his contemplation of the 
various dates. Adam worked out that he had created a pattern of marking the 
heaviest experiences in his life on his unconscious, skin, wall, conscious. 
While this revelation may not seem a task of deus ex machina caliber, as 
the plight of the abject, he was coming into much more than a symbolic 
recognition of his embodied legacy. For Adam, the cyclical game of trauma that 
characterizes abjection emerges in the primal embodied experience of 
experimenting with abjection (the marking or injuring of his body), and the much 
later realization of that abjection for what it was, and even still the later 
acceptance of what he had then realized, allowing for the on-going trauma of 
interrogating his drive to modify his embodiment. Adam's self-reflection does not 
extend to the point at which his desire is considered malevolent or disposable, 
nor is it nullified. Rather, the apprehension concedes the immediacy of the drive 
to become a point of contemplation. It does not go away, because it never was 
simply a matter of locating the desire. This is the mistake we make when we 
consider speaking the unspeakable the analytic process. If this is the case we do 
not bend to see that abjection has morphed from a metaphorical maternal 
relation and its (dis)embodied correlates into an integrated social of abject bodies 
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navigating the uncanny terrain of subjective relations, as exemplified by 
embodiment troubles. This is our contemporary condition. For this particular 
group (body modifiers), fulfilling desires becomes the means for working through 
them. Because Adam interprets the drive as both related to his own experiences 
of abjection and an aware and assertively hedonistic desire for new sensations 
he problematizes his own analysis. 
Baudrillard: 
In working through the bulk of Baudrillard's writing as a challenge both 
intellectual and otherwise, I have realized that his work, whether dealing more 
directly with the political, aesthetic or technological, offers us very compelling 
interpretations of contemporary bodies. The usefulness of a Baudrillard begins 
for this project with his writing on the subject/object problem. Analysis of the 
subject object relationship meets any project in which research is aligned with a 
consideration of aesthetic properties (in this case, embodiment). 
The elective self amputee may be seen as succumbing to the seduction of 
their self conflated object- the appendage of their obsession. In this sense 
(through a metaphoric implosion of the body as subject/abject/object) the body 
remains obsolete but can be seen as such in a new way, a way for revenge of 
the object, whereby the created body has reversed its subject's embodiment. As 
Tobias simply puts it; "What I want, need, is my left leg off above the knee. As 
things are I want to live my life as an amputee with everything it entails." Tobias's 
left leg is the object that has usurped his rightful subjectivity as a four limbed 
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embodied subject, by the seduction of a complete obsession that transfers his 
fears and anxieties onto his leg. His leg is the symbol for the fears and anxieties 
that form the specific obsession, and more than a symbol, his leg becomes the 
obsession worth ridding through the literal act of amputation. 
We disembody through a postmodern perversion of material forms, 
dramatically altering the way we look through plastic surgery and other 
processes. We are confused by our embodiment and this confusion reflects the 
tendency to look at our bodies as projects engaged in the near-constant 
refutation of age, disease, and ugliness, forgetting that our bodies are natural 
forms subject to constant and essential change. Our confusion comes in part 
from the hyper abundance of methods through which we can play with our 
identity and embodiment courtesy of the World Wide Web. The internet is more 
than a mirror to the social: it is a parallel social world that threatens to absorb our 
lived embodied experiences, if it has not done so already. Baudrillard explores 
how our thinking has been crafted to work within such dualities as mind/body, 
which may only stand for the existence of reversibility (if A may be opposite to B, 
A may be B), he offers this concept through the consideration of good and evil as 
perfectly interchangeable concepts (Baudrillard, 1990). The "evil twin" or perfect 
other of society is the society we have created by sieving society into the virtual 
world. This society not only reflects ourselves and our sociality, but transfers it 
into absorption. While the base difference between the virtual and the real is that 
the real is so in every way, and that the virtual is real in almost every way, just 
not in (some) essential way, Baudrillard sees the virtual as that "excess of reality 
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that put an end to reality (Baudrillard 66 TVI). He explains this phenomenon, 
which he refers to as the "obscenity of a whole culture" through the metaphor of 
extreme obesity: 
It is when the body loses its rule and its stage or scene that it reaches this 
obscene form of obesity. It is when the social body loses its law, its scene 
and its stakes that it also reached the pure and obscene form we know it 
to be, its visible and too visible form...the spectral and transparent 
character of the whole remaining unchanged. (Baudrillard 78 FS). 
The radical transformation of embodied space characterizing obesity 
parallels the electively amputated or paralyzed body. All of these forms of 
embodiment are spectacles because they are often viewed as obscene or 
unthinkable and spatially (the space they consume and the way they fill it) they 
are other. Spectacles are such because they recall a form of abjection, which 
may or may not belong exclusively to the unconscious. We are all living in a 
world where corporeal engagement is no longer essential to perform most tasks: 
to have relationships, to work, to shop, even to have sex. These lived 
experiences are readily available cyber. Respondents who feel more engaged 
and satisfied by their online life have forgone the necessity of a body that 
functions ideally, and the "scene" and "stakes" correspondingly alter. The virtual 
world as an entity that is more real than reality itself supports the notion of meme 
rising out of our consumption of communication. I have asked all participants 
about their particular relationship with the internet and the effects of its 
networking capabilities on their lives and especially their experience of illness. 
Though most have denied that the internet had a role in forming their desire, they 
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all admit to its development of their desire. As Sean describes: 
... "Around that time, I went on the internet for the first time, and that was 
a complete, total and utter revelation, I started looking for information 
about legbraces, and wheelchairs. Somehow, I came across Sue, who 
was the very first person I knew to share my need for paralysis. To 
discover that I wasn't the only one elicited a feeling of freedom, of 
lightness, and somehow of validation. I was a freak, ok, but I wasn't the 
only freak! I found more people like me, though the other "wannabes" I 
knew of mostly desired amputation(s). I found a community of amputees 
and devotees, and was able to speak about all these feelings freely. It was 
very therapeutic. It helped me accept the fact that I was transabled. It 
helped me shed guilt and shame. I started a website...! shared my 
thoughts, feelings, experiences as they related to BUD. Through the 
website, I was able to meet many others who felt like me. It was good to 
be able to talk about it all. It allowed me a greater understanding of myself, 
and of the condition. It also helped me to know I was able to help others". 
There are gross forms of nurtured difference which crop up in all societies 
(e.g. the obese body, the anorexic body). These forms of embodiment may be 
representative of the utter elimination of real difference through our surrender to 
cyber culture. Taking up much space through a morbidly obese physique, or less 
through a voluntary amputation are both alarming trends in contemporary 
society. They involve transforming embodiment from the root, and reek of 
something entirely unsettling about the way we are. Baudrillard's theory may be a 
finger on the pulse. 
Butler: 
If it seems unlikely to look to Baudrillard and Kristeva in the same breath, 
it may seem doubly incongruent to include Judith Butler. Butler's criticism of 
Kristeva was fodder for her work in Gender Trouble, in which she accuses 
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Kristeva of having reproduced the same paternal law she seeks to subordinate 
through her heterogeneity and female essentialism that calls for maternity as the 
primer for identity: 
"The repression of the feminine does not require that the agent of 
oppression and the object of repression be ontologically distinct. Indeed, 
repression may be understood to produce the object that it comes to deny" 
(Butler 126 GT). 
However, inasmuch as I lean towards Kristeva for the analysis of my 
interviews, the overall topic of embodiment troubles is one wholly indebted to the 
invaluable work of Butler on Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter. Butler's 
project is to show us that discourse creates bodies; that they are subject to a 
deeply entrenched political historicity that identifies them. This is not a process 
contingent on biology and the human necessity for reproduction, though these 
facts have been convincing material for the promotion of sex as a categorical 
imperative insistent on few spaces for contesting identities. 
Butler asserts that there are only certain types of bodies that we want, that 
there are only particular bodies within the approved social- political realm of 
desire, and that these bodies lie on some spectrum of normalcy or reflect an 
approved standard of embodied subjectivity. For my informants, embodiment 
troubles arise when the desired body not only does not match, but refutes these 
standards and, moreover, contradicts the construction of health from the most 
drastic and basic philosophical level of embodiment: to be physically whole, and 
to perceive that one should exercise choice in that matter. 
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The orders of valued bodies, normative bodies, Bodies That Matter are 
officially regulated through the medical system, DSM and surgical approval. The 
official inclusion of particular bodies is not removed from feminist or any other 
social prerogative of what is allowed to exist. However, as with my anonymous 
informant who performs unsanctioned "body mod" operations, there are 
professionals who deviate from this spectrum, who aid in creating a more 
complex and changing gender and ability spectrum. The genealogy of 
normalizing bodies and sexualities which assert a particular formulation of bodies 
that are allowed to be desirable does not include abject embodiments: 
transsexual or ambiguous bodies, disabled bodies or obese bodies which have 
not been regulated for desire. If you do desire (to an obsessive capacity, 
symbolically, or even openly) an embodiment that falls outside this agreement, 
as your own embodiment or some other's embodiment, it is official consented 
upon that you have a perversion, a fetish, a paraphilia, a disorder, or at the very 
least something to be made into hilarity and pornography. 
The possibility of being desired as a disabled person comes down to a 
very frank statement made recently (July, 2008) in a "nationally representative" 
poll commissioned by Disaboom (a disability community website): Over 52% of 
Americans would rather die than be severely disabled. Here we have the medical 
and social model collide; how bad disability is in reality versus our social 
perception of disability. We must desire somebody in spite of the fact that they 
are disabled; this cannot be the reason for desiring somebody. I wonder, can it 
be a part of desiring somebody? Must the difference hinge on sexuality? Claire 
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uses this notion as a defense of her attraction to disabled people: "If it is dirty 
and horrible and disgusting to be attracted to someone with a disability what 
does it say about that person with the disability- does that mean that they are 
dirty and disgusting and horrible too?" 
The internet has dramatically transformed the way we experience 
repression, allowing for groups who have fallen through the social triage dujour 
to gather on some level: to connect, share and inspire. What that collective might 
seem to brew (desire for disabled forms of embodiment) was in existence prior to 
the dramatic transformations of this technocentric era: whether the problem has 
become amplified or plainly revealed does not negate the existence of the 
problem. Therein lays the possibility that severe embodiment troubles have 
somatic origins. I do not want to dispose of this possibility, nor do I want my 
readers to automatically refute the possibility, though it does not seem likely. 
There is a high probability that these troubles are social-psychological 
phenomena. As a social problem, growth of apparently recent membership to 
having BUD is reflective of the particular social conditions that paint our everyday 
worlds. These conditions include disengagement with physical activity and the 
abundance of time spent online as well as the phantasmagorical way of speaking 
and thinking about our bodies. On the other hand they also indicate an important 
resistance to traditions of corporeal desirability. 
Though we fracture our identities into all sorts of schizophrenic divides, 
wholeness is seen as the ultimate achievement in a culture still terrorized by 
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Cartesian dualism. Individuals who drastically alter borders of identity redirect 
desires which have emerge from corporeal forms: 
If to assume a sexed position is to is to identify with a position marked out 
within the symbolic domain, and if to identify involves fantasizing the 
possibility of approximating that symbolic site, then the heterosexist 
constraint that compels the assumption of sex operates through the 
regulation of phantasmatic identification. The oedipal scenario depends for 
its livelihood on the threatening power of its threat, on the resistence to 
identification with masculine feminization and feminine phallicization. But 
what happens if the law that deploys the spectral figure of abject 
homosexuality as a threat becomes in itself an inadvertent site of 
eroticlzation? (96-7 BTM) 
What might happen are creations of new sexual identities and what might 
be considered positive reinterpretations of the phallocentric model. Some 
consider these new interpretations horrifyingly aggressive, a literal fracturing of 
embodiment to sit well in a schizoid society where fantasy has always been 
constructed upon a prohibition: prohibition bore desire and desire as the 
possibility to act for said prohibitive bodies. 
In psychoanalysis, identity as an essence not contingent on the threat of 
paternal law becomes an impossibility. Kristeva refutes this principle by 
supporting the pre-existence of the maternal form, positing that the female 
identity is not of a lack, but the origin of the symbolic order. Butler contends that it 
is through its reformation of the same necessity that Kristeva's reformulation sets 
to refute (the Big Other), that reorganizes the paternal law in a self-same fashion, 
doing no progress for the emergence of subordinate possibilities for identities 
outside heterogeneity. Butler's radical democratic project for identity/sexuality 
84 
calls for identity to work as a "site of permanent political contest' (Butler 222 
BTM) whereby: 
If subversion is possible, it will be a subversion from within the terms of 
the law, through the possibilities that emerge when the law turns against 
itself and spawns unexpected permutations of itself. The culturally 
constructed body will then be liberated, neither to its "natural" past, nor to 
its original pleasures, but to an open future of cultural possibilities. 
(127 GT) 
I wonder then, what identities are intended to be included in her project? 
She names feminized males and phallacized females, but for whom else is this 
democratization palpable? Would she concur that the identity trouble qualifying 
the GID experience deserves the comparison to BUD? To paraphrase Butler (97 
BTM): Does the refusal to concur with the abjection of (disability) necessitate a 
critical rethinking of the psychoanalytic economy of (desire)? If the identity project 
uinterrogate(s) the exclusions by which it (sex) proceeds" (ibid), does disability, 
which is always contingent upon signifying the exclusion of ability in the definition 
of particular bodies, parallel sex. To propose the use of the term embodiment 
troubles rather than disability might be the type of subversion Butler calls for, but 
who else would she extend this challenge to: the "naturally" disabled claiming 
ownership for their form(s), or those who desire.elective, more than symbolic 
mutations? I posit this question because it is unclear who her identity project will 
be open to: there is a real absence of bodies within these texts (Gender Trouble, 
Bodies That Matter), though there is evidence within the text that she sees LBGT 
(lesbian, bisexual, gay, transsexual/gender) bodies/performances as making 
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headway in this direction, what for the ability spectrum and the body modification 
sub-culture?. Butler articulates the horrors of consistent exclusion of 
homogenous sexual identities, particularly of lesbians, through their slotting into 
the psychotic and neurotic realm, but are there other bodies which will always 
remain outside the borders of what matters? 
Perhaps, just as Butler asserts, our physical bodies are not attached to an 
essence, but to a performance and the pretending of some who identify as 
having BUD is just as real as the fully functioning body they were born with. 
People with BUD might have envisioned a body that will force them to assume a 
non-sexual identity (a nullified genital libido), an identity which is symbolic of the 
subordinate, the fear of being castrated, and the fear of not being castrated. As 
Butler reveals, "the radical unthinkability of desiring otherwise" (96 BTM) is what 
bodies marked by disability show us. 
Embodiment Deficits: 
Another theoretical tool useful for conceptualizing a social study of 
embodiment troubles is the notion of "embodiment deficit". While amputation and 
paralysis indicate a literal, physical deficit, Greg Niemeyer coined the term to 
describe a much more widely shared human experience:. 
"The capacity of humans to extend their bodies to include technically 
mediated experiences may be limited. A person may reach such a limit, as 
the amount of bodily experiences exceeds the amount of mediated, 
embodied experiences. The embodiment deficit is one possible result of 
that state. A person may seek any kind of physical experience to 
compensate for an embodiment deficit, including playful, intense physical 
experiences without any particular purpose... Another outcome of 
excessive media experience maybe self-alienation." 
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Cravings for intense physical experiences would predictably be for ones 
which are stimulating and active, involving physical work. Those with more 
radical embodiment troubles present another side to this problem; compulsion for 
the intense and radical experience of paralysis, amputation, using a wheelchair, 
or another. While this seems to be on the opposite pole to what Neimeyer 
suggests, their desires may be considered severe culminations of embodiment 
deficit combined with another less discemable problem. As dire as their 
particular cases may be I have found that my participants are not immune to the 
ebbs and flows within the embodiment deficit spectrum. Here Claire describes 
some variation in her desire to become paraplegic which constitutes cravings for 
active physical experiences: 
"It's weird. My body needs to move. I want to go for a long walk and enjoy 
the spring sunshine... I am craving activity. Not in my chair. On two legs. 
Able-bodied. My whole body... The only reason that I can't is that I have 
painted myself into this corner. I did it on purpose because I needed NOT 
to use my legs. I needed to have no choice in the matter. Needed to need 
my chair. I still need my chair. I still need to not be able to walk. But my 
body is SCREAMING to move. It's created an awful dichotomy in which 
my BUD is at war with other basic instincts... My BUD is what it is. This is 
what it is. It's a war between my mind and my body and this is just one 
more manifestation of it" 
As mentioned, I offer an extension of the term embodiment deficit to 
encompass more radical negotiations of embodiment, whereby embodiment 
deficit may describe a condition which now plagues much of the social body of 
cyber cultures. It extends itself to extreme cases in the desire to radically, 
partially, disembody, where it must be accompanied by other factors (social-
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psychological) to result in such extremities. Embodiment deficits also hold a more 
mild and inclusive grasp, nearer to what Neimeyer intended, which makes its 
more extreme forms relatable to those of us who suffer only the usual 
embodiment troubles. 
The second form includes the experience of possessing nostalgia for 
something that seems uncanny, which should not be mistaken for youth, but 
which last happened to us in our early youth. This sometimes unconscious 
nostalgia longs for the before we were immersed in the subtleties of cyber culture 
and the possibility for increased connectivity and communication of one's own 
identity through technological mediums, and especially now through user driven 
forums (discussion boards, membersites (fringe and mainstream such as 
MySpace, Facebook, YouTube). We have surrendered some degrees of physical 
engagement with social life, and this has increased maladies of soul, psyche and 
physical bodies. I am of the last generation who may possess a (albeit terribly 
hazy) point of origin for the nostalgia for physical experiences without a virtual 
reference point 
What I mean by this nostalgia is a sort of embodied longing, a desire 
without a necessary direction, that is somehow transferred into disembodied 
experiences, i.e. time spent on the internet collecting information. The virtual 
reference point may be any form of media, whether we are drawing from political, 
sexual or other content. This is not an experience relegated to my generation, but 
as people younger than myself come into this world they are emerging in an 
already omnipotent digital saturation. The stakes are that they may become so 
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fully immersed in the internet at such a young age they forget alternative 
methods of socializing to draw from. This is a definite wager because this new 
way of being human forgets much of what it is to be embodied human subjects, 
namely the body. My forbearers also experience this connectivity disconnect, 
many of whom are as internet savvy as my generation or more so, being those 
who really brought us these new heights of digital connectivity (generation X). If 
there is a digital divide to be drawn, however increasingly illusive it is becoming 
both economically and geographically, it may be done so just as convincingly in 
relation to age. Many older people have escaped the major seduction of the 
internet, yet are fully subject to its power in their experience of the daily 
frustrations and resulting anxieties of adapting to a seemingly foreign digital 
culture, or those resulting from remaining on the fringe of that culture. 
As we saturate our psyches with an overflow of information; fractured 
meaning found through constant internet browsing. A pedagogy particular to the 
navigation techniques of cyberspace fills us up in a very elusive and unsatisfying 
way, whereby we may know obscure ins and outs of otherwise inaccessible 
information, but are increasingly lacking aye ne sais quoi, which may be a 
tradition of lived experience, an engagement with the access of information. 
Without implying a conspiratorial or overly negative lean, it is important to my 
work to consider how the internet has altered our human experiences. It is 
impossible to weigh the balance between benefits and detriments, but I tend 
towards a somewhat pessimistic approach because of the pervasiveness of 
evidence I encounter in my daily life. I have seen the internet dramatically 
89 
transform our interactions on an unprecedented^ massive scale and these kinds 
of changes are obviously not neutral, yet I cannot help but remark on the 
possible consequences of such drastic transformations of the social. We are 
collectively disengaged from the reality of our bodies. There is a new kind of 
crisis of identity happening, resulting in our being more restless, where people 
find themselves in liquid, temporary relationships, living very much in digital 
photographs, and craving stimulating experiences. Very few already mediated 
reactions are not subject to a proliferation of several layers of mediation. This 
saturation further separates the experiential stimulus from our embodiment. An 
example of what I am referring to can be found at any concert: observe the crowd 
watching the giant screens through the little blue screens of their digital recording 
devices. Where is the guttural engagement with the music, where are the 
eyeballs, where are the ear drums? This illustrates how we disembody even 
through embodied experiences. 
I do lament a time that is running through my fingers like sands, where the 
choices people made had consequences that were not moderated by a non-
human actor that acts with as much authority as the complex workings of the 
internet. My informants spend a particularly significant amount of time online 
accessing information about their condition and participating in relationships, 
conversations, and debates, especially with others who share their trouble. This 
is an action almost always defended by participants. I asked Claire whether her 
time spent online makes her more or less fully available for time spent with her 
family and friends: 
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"It's hard because some days it (going online) helps and some days it 
doesn't help. At first it felt like it really helped, to know there were others 
and I can't imagine cutting myself off from that community...I've gotten so 
many emails from people that say things like, 7 can't believe I'm not the 
only one, I'm so glad you're out there'...I'm not sure if I want it to go back 
to the way it was or not, because before my mind was always somewhere 
else, like there was hardly any peace. Now I can go and focus on that 
(being online on BUD related forums), I can use my chair and there is a lot 
of time I'm not focusing on that. I can help people I can have one on one 
conversation. I feel like I'm helping to further knowledge and 
understanding about BUD.. .and so, if I were to get rid of my chair and shut 
off my contact with the community it would all just be up here again (taps 
head)...In some ways its kind of 6 one way, half dozen of the other and 
I'm not willing to go back...I'm a bit of an internet addict, if I could control 
that and still be online helping people..in a way my activities online, if I 
could control that I would be much better off. It is really hard to have a 
balance." 
Taking Neimeyer's definition and elaborating upon the seed idea by 
approaching embodiment deficit through a broader philosophical spectrum 
allows for the specificity of analysing various examples, for pairing a 
comprehensive term with the possibility for an evolving approach for 
epidemiology in sociology in relation to meme in its formation of mood disorders, 
somatoform disorders, identity problems and paraphilias within cyber cultures, 
and how they intersect with real physical embodiments such as the actual body 
modifications discussed here, as well as more common physical ailments like 
carpal tunnel syndrome (Ashton, 2008). 
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(In)conclusions: 
While First's pioneering study on BUD included only those who desire 
amputations, his follow-up study encompasses people who 'need' various 
disabilities. The question as to whether these will result in further distinction 
within the realm of people desiring disabilities remains unseen, as does the level 
of their possibility for inclusion in pending volumes of the DSM. The motivation 
towards diagnostic classification is one that is of ethical concern, and therefore 
multi-faceted. There remains the idea of the mad scientist; he who wants fame 
regardless of notoriety, or he who is motivated by gain; the scientist diocese 
under the multi-billion dollar church of pharmaceuticals that do major business 
treating new illness. There also hovers the humanist research imperative driven 
by the desire to help people suffer less. After speaking at length with BUD 
sufferers, I cannot help but imagine that the conversations First and others have 
had with GID and BUD patients has been a driver in advocating for more 
research and for treatment options. In our already salient psychopharmaceutical 
culture, the option of surgery appears to be the most controversial. 
My interview subjects have either undergone their ideal body image 
realization without the assistance of surgeons or have been pretending for years. 
They have all sought psychiatric help, have all been diagnosed at one point with 
depression (none with psychosis), have experimented with rounds of 
antidepressants (SSRIs) and combination therapies, and surely fit into any 
pending plans for surgical eligibility as outlined by the BUD Organization (2003). 
To date, none have been able to solicit the assistance of a neurological or plastic 
surgeon, and elective procedures to become disabled are still illegal, though 
would be naive to imagine that they are impossible to get. The example of Falkirk 
stands as a testament to the possibility for surgery: Falkirk is the hospital in 
Scotland where BUD advocate Dr. Robert Smith performed a series of 
amputations for patients who he identified as suffering from Amputee Identity 
Disorder in the late 1990's, he was then barred from practice. This is the only 
example of an "official" center where voluntary demand amputations have been 
administered. 
It does not necessarily indicate that one is taking the cautionary 
perspective when one hesitates over the inclusion of BUD in the DSM V, but we 
must consider both risk and benefit. Categorization may aid in identifying people 
who suffer this psychologically torturous impairment, but I cannot help but believe 
it will also work as a recruitment tool, spinning the troubled desires of some 
confused people into the nebulous terrain of such a new problem. Still, what lies 
in store for sufferers of BUD, what would have to change in order to enable them 
to find surgical solutions to their problem? Claire posits a dire scenario: 
"The only thing that I think could change people's minds if the self-injury 
problem became so great that they say that they had to do something. I 
mean, that's why they legalized abortion...in the meantime people are 
living with hom'ble mental stress...I've seen 3 three mental health 
professionals and non e of them have ever heard of BUD and when one 
looked it up they said 'that's too marginal'.'' 
Queer activist Leslie Feinberg (1998) writes, "My right to be me is tied with 
a thousand threads to your right to be you"(101). Ought we assert the right to 
self-determined embodiment in the individual capacities we see fit only to deny 
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that right for another person, however much we may fear the direction of the 
embodied subjectivity they desire? Is "that grotesque form of obesity" discussed 
by Baudrillard (1990) a much more radical example of the negotiation of 
embodied space than amputation? While these questions are provocative, I do 
not necessarily think they can be answered. Still, I cannot remain silent or 
unaffected by the cybercultural wasteland I regard as heavily implicated in these 
phenomena through which people suffer such exquisite embodiment difficulties. 
Limits over our rights to determine our embodiment may be broad, but are still 
susceptible to a level of official control and legislation, the ethics of which is a 
complicated issue. We failingly advocate human rights while denying complete 
individual rights over our own embodiment; where should human rights begin and 
who should be allowed to determine them? 
I know that the burden of this problem is more tremendous than I can 
begin to grasp for those suffering from BUD, that they would live any other 
possible way if they were able, but see the realization of their 'true' body image 
as the only solution. In the words of Sean, "I need to be a paraplegic. This 
simple statement cannot begin to describe the depth of despair and anguish this 
need creates". Suicide attempts, fear, 'pretending', isolation and depression has 
marked the life of Sean and so many others who suffer from this very bizarre, 
relatively unknown condition. When I speak with Sean, Claire, Adam and others I 
am compelled by their objective analytic capacities and sincerity. They may have 
found communities which they belong to online, but they make a convincing case 
for having felt the onset of their desires/needs at a much earlier date. 
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As random as this condition may seem, we should remain compassionate 
towards those affected, and open to debate over the philosophical questions that 
seem to turn these people into abject antagonists, not only because we cannot 
truly understand it, but because they are genuinely suffering. We live in a society 
laced with maladies, perhaps one that is quite sick in and of itself, but these 
people suffer a situation so grave and complex we can barely open ourselves up 
enough to their own articulations to hear what they are saying. Before I had 
participants agree to be interviewed I was clear that I was not writing to advocate 
for surgery rights for patients with BUD. Sean had the following response; 
"Fair warning! To reciprocate, while I appreciate this and think it is 
important in the long run to have such papers, I have to say, I tire of that. I 
am advocating for surgery as a viable option for us. I have lived in hell for 
over 35 years, and cannot bear it much longer. I tend to be more 
enthused and more willing to support people who also push in that 
direction." 
While a clear answer to the surgery option is ever more problematized the 
more I speak with BUD patients, I still am not advocating surgery, though I have 
come to better understand the tendency, and adequately consider that debate. 
Interview participants speak so many layers of experience; it seems much easier 
to latch onto a singular aspect of their abjection to find something concrete, 
comprehensive or plausible to attribute it to. This spawns philosophies whose 
debates are divided around the rhetoric about the claim that we might possibly 
solve this problem or bring it into the spectra of sense and sensibility through 
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biology, neurology, psychology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, medicalization, 
business, entertainment, art, sociology, anthropology or whatever other of the 
various points of entry and adoption, as we all stake a claim in solving the 
unknowable nature of something so utterly bizarre. 
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